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THE MARRIAGE OF STATE LAW AND INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AND A NEW LIMIT ON THE FEDERAL 
DEATH PENALTY 
JONATHAN ROSS 
ABSTRACT 
Since the 1990s, federal prosecutors have, with increasing frequency, 
sought the death penalty for federal offenses committed in and also 
punishable under the laws of non-death penalty states. Critics of this 
practice have pointed out that federal prosecutors can use the federal 
death penalty to circumvent a state's abolition of capital punishment. 
Courts, however, have almost unanimously rejected arguments that state 
law should be a shield from federal punishment for federal offenses. This 
article proposes a novel way to challenge the federal death penalty's use in 
a non-death penalty state—the Supreme Court's reasoning in United 
States v. Windsor. In Windsor, the Court held that federal interference 
with a state law right arising in an area traditionally regulated by states is 
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. In some 
instances, Windsor precludes federal capital prosecutions.  
 
This article considers a Windsor-based motion to dismiss a notice of 
intent to seek the federal death penalty. The federal capital prosecution in 
a non-death penalty state interferes with a state law right to not be 
executed. As states have traditionally prosecuted violent murders, this 
right arises in an area traditionally regulated by states. Applying due 
process scrutiny, a court will ask whether a prosecutor's animus towards 
the state's lack of capital punishment motivated the prosecution in the first 
place, or whether there is an independent federal interest. If animus alone 
motivated the prosecution, then Windsor demands that the court reject the 
attempt to seek capital punishment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 19, 2013, law enforcement officials captured Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 
suspecting that, four days earlier, Tsarnaev and his brother detonated bombs near the 
finish line of the Boston Marathon. More than a month later, on May 28, 2013, the 
Sixth Circuit issued an en banc opinion affirming the death sentence imposed by a 
federal district court on Marvin Gabrion for a murder Gabrion committed in a 
national forest in Michigan. Just under a month after that, on June 26, 2013, the 
Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor, invalidating the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act and clearing the way for federal recognition of same-sex marriages. 
These three events, occurring within a span of approximately two months, seem to 
have little in common. The remainder of this Article explains why that is not the 
case.  
One of the unexpected consequences of the Boston Marathon bombings was a 
reexamination of the federal death penalty’s place in our federalist system.1 There 
was never any doubt Tsarnaev would be charged federally even though his conduct 
also violated state law.2 At the press conference where federal and state prosecutors 
                                                                                                                                          
 1 David Abel & Martin Finucane, Tsarnaev Indicted on 30 Counts, BOS. GLOBE, June 28, 
2013, at A1.  
 2 Almost immediately after federal authorities apprehended Tsarnaev, the Suffolk County 
District Attorney’s Office spokesman stated that attorneys in the office were reviewing the 
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announced the charges, the Suffolk County District Attorney stated that a parallel 
state prosecution for the same conduct would “only drag out the process” and be 
redundant of the federal charges.3 Although state prosecutors did not hesitate before 
deferring to the federal charges, their decision added a new complication to the case. 
In 1984, Massachusetts’s highest court held that the state’s death penalty statute 
violated the state constitution.4 Some of the federal offenses with which the 
indictment charged Tsarnaev, however, are punishable by death.5 Thus, the issue 
arose as to whether the federal death penalty should be imposed for an offense 
punishable under both state and federal law and committed in a state that does not 
authorize capital punishment.6 While commentators quickly noticed this anomaly, 
few were troubled by it. One Massachusetts newspaper praised the decision to indict 
Tsarnaev with death-eligible federal offenses, particularly in light of the 
unavailability of capital punishment under state law.7 A Massachusetts resident and 
family member of a victim stated she had previously opposed capital punishment, 
but, in Tsarnaev’s case, “an eye for an eye [felt] appropriate.”8  
When the issue came up in another state and involved a crime that received less 
national attention, however, the responses to the federal charges were different. As 
mentioned, on May 28, 2013, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Marvin Gabrion’s federal 
death sentence.9 More than fifteen years earlier, Gabrion, a Michigan resident, had 
abducted and murdered a woman who was set to testify against him in a pending 
state prosecution for rape. Unbeknownst to him, Gabrion was within the confines of 
                                                                                                                                          
case in the event that they decided to bring “any collateral state charges” related to the 
bombing. Prosecutors in the adjacent Middlesex County considered pursuing state murder 
charges based on the post-bombing murder of a university police officer. Dave Wedge & Erin 
Smith, Bomb Suspect Faces Intense Questioning, BOS. HERALD, Apr. 22, 2013, at 4 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 3 Abel & Finucane, supra note 1.  
 4 See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 134 (Mass. 1984). Even before 
that time, no one had been executed in the state since 1947. See David Abel & Martin 
Finucane, As Kin, Survivors Watch, Tsarnaev Pleads Not Guilty, BOS. GLOBE, July 11, 2013, 
at A1.  
 5 See Milton J. Valencia, Saving Suspect From Death Penalty Will Be Defense Focus, 
BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 24, 2013, at A1. The death-eligible charged offenses were: (1) conspiracy to 
use a weapon of mass destruction resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)(2), as 
well as five substantive counts of the same offense; (2) conspiracy to bomb a place of public 
use resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a)(1) & (c), as well as two substantive 
counts of the same offense; and (3) conspiracy to maliciously destroy property resulting in 
personal injury and death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) & (n), as well as one substantive 
count of the same offense.  
 6 On January 30, 2014, Attorney General Eric Holder authorized federal prosecutors to 
seek the death penalty in Tsarnaev’s case. See Death Penalty Sought in Boston Bombing, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Jan. 31, 2014, at 20.  
 7 Editorial, A Strong Week for Boston Justice System, DAILY ITEM (Lynn, Mass.), June 28, 
2013, at A4.  
 8 David Abel, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Faces Charges in April Attacks Today, BOS. GLOBE, 
July 10, 2013, at A1.  
 9 United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc).   
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the Manistee National Forest when he disposed of the body.10 Thus, he was subject 
to federal prosecution and the federal death penalty.11 Michigan, like Massachusetts, 
is a non-death penalty state—the first one, in fact.12 Unlike Tsarnaev’s case, though, 
there was no obvious federal dimension to Gabrion’s crime. Gabrion’s motive was to 
thwart a pending state prosecution. The federal link—the crime’s location—was 
apparently unintended. Unsurprisingly, local reaction to the federal capital 
prosecution of Gabrion was strong and negative. A western Michigan newspaper 
published the following editorial:  
Governments, whether state or federal, shouldn't be in the business of 
putting people to death. Michigan law has a far more reasonable and 
moral penalty: Murderers are jailed for life. One of the hallmarks of a 
civilized society is that it doesn't cater to a raw impulse for revenge, 
however deeply and understandably felt by the families of victims.13  
Other local newspapers echoed these sentiments.14 A legal academic labeled 
Gabrion’s death sentence an affront to federalism.15  
The juxtaposition of Gabrion’s and Tsarnaev’s cases exemplifies the divergent 
opinions on the federal death penalty’s use for crimes committed in and punishable 
under the law of non-death penalty states. The issue is not a new one. In a 1999 
article, former Justice Department official Rory K. Little noted that “[s]ignificant 
federalism and state sovereignty issues lurk beneath the surface of a nationally 
uniform federal death penalty.”16 Two years later, a student commentator speculated 
that “an interesting sovereignty and federalism question would arise if a federal 
prosecution was undertaken in a state that affirmatively prohibited the death penalty 
as a matter of state law.”17 These scholars recognized the problem before any federal 
jury ever imposed a death sentence in a non-death penalty state. Their concern was 
hypothetical only.18 This changed in 2002 with Gabrion’s sentencing. As discussed 
                                                                                                                                          
 10 Id. at 515.  
 11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012).  
 12 See Eugene G. Wanger, Historical Reflections on Michigan’s Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 755, 755 (1996). 
 13 Editorial, Opening Death’s Door? GR’s First Capital Case Shouldn’t Lead to More in 
Michigan, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 21, 2002, at A12.  
 14 Editorial, A Tale of Two States, Juries, SAGINAW NEWS, Mar. 20, 2002, at 7A (“Sending 
[Gabrion] to prison without the possibility of parole might not satisfy our sense of outrage, but 
emotions shouldn't guide our system of law.”).  
 15 See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Face Federal Execution in Michigan? Let State’s 
Laws Decide, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 5, 2011, at A9.  
 16 Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the 
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 356–57 (1999). 
 17 Sean M. Morton, Comment, Death Isn’t Welcome Here: Evaluating the Federal Death 
Penalty in the Context of a State Constitutional Objection to Capital Punishment, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 1435, 1436–37 (2001) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  
 18 Between the reintroduction of the federal death penalty and 2002, no federal defendant 
received a death sentence in a district court located in a non-death penalty state or other 
jurisdiction. See id. at 1438–39; Little, supra note 16, at 355–58. In 2000, each of the twenty-
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infra, since the issue became concrete, scholars and defense attorneys alike have 
argued at length that the federal death penalty is inappropriate in such cases. 
Regardless of the moral or federalism merits of their arguments, courts have 
eschewed holding that the federal government lacks the authority to seek a 
statutorily authorized sentence for a federal crime.  
That could soon change. In addition to Tsarnaev’s indictment and the en banc 
opinion in Gabrion, a third event occurred in 2013 that might provide the doctrinal 
basis for the strong prudential arguments put forward by these scholars and 
defendants. On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Windsor v. 
United States, invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).19 Nothing in the 
opinion is remotely related to the death penalty, however, the Court’s reasoning can 
be applied outside the facts of same-sex marriage—to challenges to the federal death 
penalty. 
This Article explains how the Windsor Court provided a new framework for 
defendants to challenge the federal death penalty’s use in non-death penalty states. 
Part II discusses the federal death penalty issue’s history. Part III addresses the 
scholarly literature on the topic, and explains why each of the solutions put forward 
previously are foreclosed by precedent and would create greater problems than they 
would solve. Part IV turns to Windsor, and Part V demonstrates how that opinion 
can and should be extended to allow for state law-based challenges to the federal 
death penalty when the decision to bring federal charges was motivated by animus 
toward a state’s lack of capital punishment.  
II. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY IN NON-DEATH PENALTY JURISDICTIONS 
A. Federal Capital Prosecutions in Non-Death Penalty Jurisdictions 
In 2002, Gabrion became the first person since the reintroduction of the federal 
death penalty to receive a death sentence for a crime committed in a non-death 
penalty state.20 Subsequently, federal prosecutors in non-death penalty jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                                          
one defendants on federal death row had been convicted in death-penalty states. Rory K. 
Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529, 542–44 (2000). 
During the Clinton administration, federal prosecutors filed notices of intent to seek the death 
penalty in seventeen cases being prosecuted in non-death penalty jurisdictions (Michigan, 
Iowa, Alaska, and the District of Columbia). In none of those cases, however, did the federal 
juries ever actually make a capital sentence recommendation. Rather: (1) in one case, the 
government voluntarily dismissed the capital charges after determining that its evidence was 
insufficient to proceed; (2) in one case, the defendant was found shot to death after the 
government filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty, but before the trial began; (3) in 
four cases, the government subsequently withdrew its notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty; (4) in nine cases, the government allowed the defendants to plead guilty and receive 
sentences short of death; and (5) in one case, the district court dismissed the capital charge 
after determining that the indictment had alleged an insufficient Commerce Clause nexus. See 
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH COUNCIL, FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS ARISING IN NON-
DEATH PENALTY STATES (Mar. 19, 2013) 1–4, available at 
http://www.capdefnet.org/FDPRC/pubmenu.aspx?menu_id=96&folder_id=5120.         
 19 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 20 Eric A. Tirschwell & Theodore Hertzberg, Politics and Prosecution: A Historical 
Perspective on Shifting Federal Standards for Pursuing the Death Penalty in Non-Death 
Penalty States, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 57, 62 (2009).  
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have regularly sought capital punishment. In total, federal juries in these places have 
made capital sentencing recommendations in twenty-one cases.21 In nine of those 
cases (including Gabrion), juries have sentenced the defendants to death.22 There are 
multiple reasons for this rise in federal death sentences in non-death penalty 
jurisdictions.  
First, the number of federal capital prosecutions has risen, regardless of where an 
offense occurred, since the 1994 enactment of the Federal Death Penalty Act 
(“FDPA”).23 The FDPA ensured the federal death penalty complied with the due 
process requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.24 The 
existence of the FDPA alone, however, does not account for the rise of death penalty 
prosecutions in non-death penalty jurisdictions. Notably, the increase did not occur 
until approximately five years after the statute’s enactment. Rather, this phenomenon 
is best explained by changes in Justice Department policy. Shortly after the FDPA’s 
passage, Attorney General Janet Reno amended the United States Attorneys’ Manual 
to add the “Capital Case Protocols.”25 These provisions govern the Department’s 
administration of the death penalty. The original version of the Protocols made clear 
that the Attorney General is required to approve in writing all capital prosecutions.26 
The Protocols required a federal prosecutor planning to charge a defendant with a 
                                                                                                                                          
 21 FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH COUNSEL, supra note 18.  
 22 Id. at 4–24. Courts later vacated two of those death sentences, one on direct appeal, and 
one in a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 11, 16; see also United States v. 
Whitten, 610 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (on direct appeal, vacating a death sentence because a 
prosecutor’s closing argument violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); 
Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (in a section 2255 
proceeding, vacating a death sentence based on a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel).  
 23 See Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959-82 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–98). For a general discussion of the enactment of the 
FDPA, see Little, supra note 16, at 385–89 and Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 20, at 75–77.  
Between 1990 and 1994, federal prosecutors filed death penalty notices in 36 cases. In the three 
following years, that number increased to 68. UNITED STATES COURTS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/Publications 
/RecommendationsCostQuality/ExecutiveSummary.aspx.  
 24 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating state death penalty statute); see Little, supra note 16, 
at 392–406. The procedures for the federal death penalty generally are, a reasonable time 
before trial, the government must serve on the defendant a notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty upon conviction, setting forth the aggravating factors that the government will attempt 
to prove at sentencing. The notice can be subsequently amended only for good cause. Id. at 
392–93; see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2012). After conviction, a separate capital sentencing 
proceeding is held before the same jury, during which the jury makes three determinations: (1) 
whether the defendant acted with the requisite mens rea to make his offense death-eligible; (2) 
what aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present; and (3) whether, in light of the 
circumstances present, a sentence of death is warranted. Little, supra note 16, at 393; see 18 
U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (2012).  
 25 See Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 20, at 77; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATT’YS MANUAL § 9-10.000 (2014) available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ 
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/10mcrm.htm.  
 26 Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 20, at 77.  
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capital offense to submit a “Death Penalty Evaluation” form and a prosecution 
memorandum to Main Justice, evaluating the propriety of seeking the death penalty 
in that case. A committee at the Department reviewed the field prosecutor’s 
recommendation and advised the Attorney General.27 
In the 1995 version of the Protocols, one of the factors U.S. Attorneys and Main 
Justice officials considered was whether there was a “substantial federal interest” 
justifying federal, rather than state prosecution. The Protocols advised prosecutors 
that “[i]n states where the imposition of the death penalty is not authorized by law 
the fact that the maximum federal penalty is death is insufficient, standing alone, to 
show a more substantial interest in federal prosecution.”28 In 2001, just before the 
end of the Clinton administration, the Justice Department issued a report 
documenting “‘geographic’ or ‘regional’ disparities” in the federal death penalty’s 
administration.29 After the report’s publication and the change in administrations, the 
new Attorney General, John Ashcroft, revised the Protocols with an eye toward 
reducing these geographic disparities.30 One of the changes directly resulted in the 
phenomenon at issue here. Ashcroft replaced the provision stating a state’s lack of 
the death penalty does not, standing alone, justify federal prosecution with a new one 
stating the “relative likelihood of . . . appropriate punishment upon conviction in the 
State and Federal jurisdictions should be considered.”31 Six years later, Justice 
Department officials again amended the Protocols—this time under the guidance of 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. The 2007 amendments clarified “national 
consistency” was one of the factors that informed a capital charging decision. 
“National consistency” meant: “treating similar cases similarly, when the only 
material difference is the location of the crime.”32 
Upon taking office, Attorney General Eric Holder did not further amend the 
Protocols, and the focus on national consistency in the administration of the federal 
death penalty remains in place. As of 2013, U.S. Attorneys in the Obama 
administration had filed death penalty notices in seven federal cases arising in non-
death penalty jurisdictions.33 
                                                                                                                                          
 27 Id. at 78. 
 28 Id. at 79. 
 29 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY 
DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (June 6, 2001), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm.  
 30 Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 20, at 81. 
 31 Id. at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted). At that time, Attorney General Ashcroft 
also revised the Protocols to require the submission to Main Justice of any case involving 
conduct potentially chargeable as a capital offense, thus preventing U.S. Attorneys from 
evading Main Justice review by charging defendants with lesser offenses based on conduct 
that could also support capital charges. Id. at 81–82.   
 32 U.S. ATT’YS MANUAL at 9-10.130(A)–(B) (2007). 
 33 FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH COUNSEL, supra note 18, at 23–24. In one case, 
prosecutors subsequently allowed the defendant to plead guilty. Id. at 23.  
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B. Locality-Based Challenges to Federal Death Sentences 
In challenges to the federal death penalty, defendants have pointed to state law. 
These defendants (and, in one case, with a state governor’s help) have made two 
general types of arguments: (1) Imposing the federal death penalty for a crime 
committed in a non-death penalty state violates the federalism principles reflected in 
the Tenth Amendment; and (2) imposing the federal death penalty for such a crime 
violates the defendant’s own federal constitutional rights secured by the criminal 
procedure provisions in the Bill of Rights. As explained, courts have almost 
unanimously rejected both types of challenges.  
1. Tenth Amendment/Federalism-Based Challenges 
In several cases arising in non-death penalty jurisdictions, defendants filed pre-
trial motions to dismiss the government’s death penalty notices, arguing that seeking 
the death penalty in their cases violated the Tenth Amendment, or the general 
federalism principles embodied in that provision.34 These challenges, however, have 
been unsuccessful. For example, in the 1999 case, United States v. Tuck Chong, the 
District of Hawaii held that the imposition of federal punishment for a federal 
offense does not violate the Tenth Amendment nor interfere with a state’s 
sovereignty.35 Because federal jurisdiction was not in dispute, the Supremacy Clause 
required that federal law prevail in any conflict with state law.36 Eight years later, in 
United States v. O’Reilly, a district court in Michigan rejected similar arguments.37   
A recent First Circuit decision shows that even when a state joins its citizen in 
asserting federalism to thwart a federal death penalty prosecution, the challenge is 
likely to fail. In United States v. Pleau,38 the First Circuit considered the extent to 
which a state governor may refuse to turn over a state detainee for federal 
prosecution. On September 20, 2010, Jason Pleau committed an armed robbery in 
Woonsocket, Rhode Island, during which he murdered a gas station manager making 
                                                                                                                                          
 34 See, e.g., United States v. O'Reilly, No. 05-80025, 2007 WL 2421378 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 
23, 2007); United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.P.R. 2000); United 
States v. Tuck Chong, 123 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Haw. 1999). The Tenth Amendment provides: 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. In 
United States v. Darby, Justice Stone famously labeled the Tenth Amendment a “truism that 
all is retained which has not been surrendered.” 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). As one 
commentator notes, under this view, the Tenth Amendment “merely reinforces the parallel 
principles elsewhere reflected in the Constitution that (1) Congress may act only within its 
enumerated authority and (2) states may act unless the Constitution prohibits the conduct.” 
David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2012). That 
commentator, however, points out that, in some cases post-Darby, the Court has “construed 
the Tenth Amendment as reserving an enclave of exclusive state sovereignty.” Id. (citing New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U.S. 833 (1976)). This Article treats the Tenth Amendment arguments and the general 
federalism arguments as indistinguishable and does not wade into this interpretive debate.   
 35 Tuck Chong, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 568.  
 36 Id.   
 37 O’Reilly, 2007 WL 2421378, at *3–4.  
 38 680 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
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a bank deposit.39 Approximately four months later, a federal grand jury in Rhode 
Island returned an indictment charging Pleau with three offenses, one of which was 
death-eligible.40 By the time the indictment came down, however, Pleau had entered 
into state custody and begun serving an eighteen-year sentence on unrelated parole 
and probation violations.41 The state’s governor, Lincoln Chafee, refused to 
surrender Pleau to federal authorities, citing Rhode Island’s lack of a death penalty 
and the federal prosecutors’ refusal to agree to not seek the federal death penalty.42 
The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, which Pleau 
challenged. Governor Chafee intervened in the case, and the matter wound its way to 
an en banc First Circuit.43 The specific issue before the en banc court was whether a 
state governor may disregard a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.44 
The court reviewed the relevant cases and concluded there was no history 
establishing a governor’s power to refuse a federal writ. Moreover, the court 
determined that the Supremacy Clause made the federal writ superior to any counter 
state statute or interests.45 Lurking behind this analysis, however, was the court’s fear 
that a governor in a non-death penalty state might interfere with federal 
administration of the federal death penalty. Judge Boudin concluded in the majority 
opinion,  
Were Pleau and Governor Chafee to prevail, Pleau could be permanently 
immune from federal prosecution . . . . He is currently serving an 18-year 
term in Rhode Island prison and, if the writ were denied, might agree to a 
state sentence of life in Rhode Island for the robbery and murder . . . . 
Instead of a place of confinement, the state prison would become a refuge 
against federal charges.46 
                                                                                                                                          
 39 Id. at 3; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(5)(B)(i) (2012). 
 40 Id.  
 41 Pleau, 680 F.3d at 3.  
 42 Id. Prosecutors first filed a written request for custody under the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers Act (“IAD”) to secure Pleau’s presence in federal court. See Pub. L. No. 91-538, 
84 Stat. 1397 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2). The IAD, an agreement 
among the states and the federal government, “provides what is supposed to be an efficient 
shortcut to achieve extradition of a state prisoner to stand trial in another state, or in the event 
of a federal request, to make unnecessary the prior custom of federal habeas action.” Pleau, 
680 F.3d at 3. When Governor Chafee refused the written request, the federal court issued the 
traditional common law writ. See id.  
 43 Pleau, 680 F.3d at 3–4.   
 44 Id. at 4–8. 
 45 Id. at 6–7 (“That there is an overriding federal interest in prosecuting defendants 
indicted on federal crimes needs no citation, and the habeas statute is an unqualified 
authorization for a federal court to insist that a defendant held elsewhere be produced for 
proceedings in federal court.”).  
 46 Id. at 7–8. In his brief, Governor Chafee acknowledged that Pleau had “offered to plead 
guilty to state murder and robbery charges and accept Rhode Island’s harshest punishment: 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.” Brief for Amicus Curiae Governor Lincoln D. 
Chafee in Support of Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner at 3, United States v. Pleau, 680 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-1775, 11-1782).  
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 Thus, Pleau indicates that even when a state intervenes to protect its citizen from 
the federal death penalty, the state’s interest in vindicating its own non-death penalty 
policy is insufficient to surmount the countervailing federal interest. In short, 
federalism (reflected in the Tenth Amendment), as a stand-alone argument, cannot 
overcome the Supremacy Clause’s placement of federal statutes—including the 
FDPA—over conflicting state statutes. The reason these federalism-based challenges 
have failed is because courts have viewed the interests and prerogatives of states 
through a restrictive lens. These courts have rejected the argument that applying 
federal punishment for federal crimes prevents states from implementing their own 
sentencing policies.47 In United States v. Fell,48 a case discussed in detail, infra, 
Judge Raggi noted that, bringing federal capital charges in a non-death penalty state 
“involves the exercise of exclusive federal power.” She went on, “It does not intrude 
on any state function; much less does it trench on the exercise of any state power. It 
poses no interference with legitimate state activities.”49 In essence, she implicitly 
reasoned that a state’s legitimate functions, powers, or activities do not include the 
conferral of rights on their citizens, and the preservation of those rights against 
federal interference. As discussed in Part III, the Supreme Court recently called this 
assumption into question.  
2. Federal Constitutional Rights-Based Challenges  
The other type of challenge rests on the substantive criminal procedure rights 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, specifically the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishments and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to 
trial by a jury of one’s peers. As for the Eighth Amendment, defendants have pointed 
to both the Eighth Amendment’s procedural and substantive protections.50 For 
example, in Gabrion, the Defense pointed to the Eighth Amendment’s procedural 
requirement he be allowed to present at sentencing all potentially mitigating 
evidence, 51 and argued that Michigan’s lack of a death penalty for state crimes was a 
mitigating circumstance that the district court should have allowed him to argue to 
                                                                                                                                          
 47 See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the federal death penalty could be imposed for crime committed in Puerto Rico, despite 
Puerto Rico’s constitutional prohibition on capital punishment: “This choice by Congress does 
not contravene Puerto Rico’s decision to bar the death penalty in prosecutions for violations of 
crimes under the Puerto Rican criminal laws in the Commonwealth courts. The choice simply 
retains federal power over federal crimes.”).  
 48 571 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (order denying hearing).  
 49 Id. at 269 (Raggi, J., concurring with denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (holding that federalism ensures “a proper respect for state 
functions” and that the federal government is not to “unduly interfere with the legitimate 
activities of the States.”)).  
 50 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (noting that the Eighth Amendment 
has “been recognized to affect significantly both the procedural and substantive aspects of the 
death penalty”).  
 51 United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that 
the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”).  
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the jury. The government’s evidence had established that Gabrion was only two-
hundred twenty-seven feet within the national forest and Gabrion maintained that 
“[t]he simple fact that [two-hundred twenty-seven] feet was the difference between a 
life sentence and a potential death sentence may have been viewed as mitigating by 
one or more jurors.”52 The en banc Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that the 
mitigating evidence a defendant is entitled to present “encompasses both culpability 
and character, all to the extent relevant to the defendant’s ‘personal responsibility 
and moral guilt.’”53 As the location of Gabrion’s offense and Michigan’s approach to 
sentencing state law offenses had “nothing to do with these things,” the district court 
had not erred.54  
Other defendants have argued that executing for a crime punishable under state 
law runs afoul of the Amendment’s substantive ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment. United States v. Fell involved a double homicide in Vermont, followed 
by a carjacking and interstate kidnapping, which eventually resulted in a third 
murder.55 After the Second Circuit denied Fell’s challenges to his federal death 
sentence for crimes committed mostly in Vermont, a non-death penalty state, the 
court declined to take up the case en banc.56 Judge Calabresi dissented, pointing out 
the infrequency with which federal juries in non-death penalty jurisdictions had 
imposed the death penalty.57 He concluded that “[w]hat is going on here is that the 
existence of certain local values makes imposition of the federal death penalty in 
states that do not have the death penalty truly uncommon.” As a result, “the 
application of the death penalty in situations that involve predominately local crimes 
in non-death penalty states may be sufficiently rare as to be constitutionally 
prohibited.”58  
Judge Raggi wrote separately to counter Judge Calabresi’s Eighth Amendment 
argument.59 Acknowledging that state practices are relevant in determining whether a 
type of punishment is “cruel and unusual” in light of “evolving standards of 
decency,” she clarified such practices gain relevance only “because in the aggregate 
such practices serve as a proxy for the ‘national consensus.’”60 The Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                          
 52 Gabrion, 719 F.3d at 522 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 53 Id. at 524 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).  
 54 Id. (“But mitigation under the Eighth Amendment is not a matter of geographic 
coordinates.”).  
 55 531 F.3d 197, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2008) (panel opinion). Fell was prosecuted federally for 
the carjacking and kidnapping conduct that occurred after the first two murders. See id.  
 56 United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 264 (denying rehearing en banc). The third murder 
took place in New York, which, at the time that Fell was indicted in 2001, still had capital 
punishment. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that New York’s 
death penalty statute was unconstitutional under the state constitution). Fell, however, was 
indicted in federal court in the district of Vermont; therefore, the courts considered Vermont’s 
lack of the death penalty.  
 57 Fell, 571 F.3d at 289 (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  
 58 Id. at 289–90.  
 59 Id. at 274 (Raggi, J., concurring with denial of rehearing en banc).  
 60 Id.; see, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (explaining that in Eighth 
Amendment cases “[t]he Court first considers ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as 
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precedent establishing that a punishment either is or is not cruel and unusual based 
on the prevailing national consensus contradicted Judge Calabresi’s proposal that 
cruelty and unusualness be assessed on a local level.61  
In Fell, Judge Calabresi also suggested the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that 
a defendant be tried “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed”—the “vicinage requirement”—might be a vehicle for 
avoiding the federal death penalty in a non-death penalty jurisdiction.62 He suggested 
the vicinage requirement might demand that federal juries in capital cases arising in 
non-death penalty states “though willing to follow the law . . . also [be] 
representative of a state’s overall opposition to the death penalty.”63 Judge Calabresi 
offered that the district court may have violated the vicinage provision if, before 
striking the venire member, it did not consider her opposition to the death penalty in 
the context of the state’s policy.64 Judge Raggi also addressed this argument, 
contending that Judge Calabresi’s view would result in the Sixth Amendment right 
meaning one thing in federal capital cases occurring in non-death penalty 
jurisdictions, and another thing in such trials occurring in places that do execute. In a 
non-death penalty state, a defendant would have a right to force the prosecutor to use 
a peremptory strike on a venire member opposed to the death penalty; in a death 
penalty state, such a venire member would be removed for cause.65  
III. SCHOLARS’ PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: FEDERALISM AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
In the cases discussed, precedent doomed the various arguments defendants (or 
judges, or governors) made. Nevertheless, two scholars have looked beyond 
precedent and offered solutions rooted in new interpretations of the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The scholars read the Clause 
as a vehicle for advancing states’ interests, and envision the Eighth Amendment 
playing a greater role in restricting federal action than has before been contemplated. 
The solutions they propose would make the Eighth Amendment an absolute bar to 
the federal death penalty in non-death penalty states. The following explains how 
these scholars’ solutions are unworkable in addition to being contrary to the 
precedent just discussed mandating uniformly interpreted federal constitutional 
provisions.  
                                                                                                                                          
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine whether there is a national 
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 425 
(2008) (considering “[t]he evidence of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty 
for child rapists”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 848–49 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (acknowledging that the relevant inquiry was whether “a national consensus 
forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed before the age of 16” existed). 
 61 Fell, 571 F.3d at 274 (Raggi, J., concurring with denial of rehearing en banc). 
 62 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 63 Fell, 571 F.3d at 284 (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  
 64 Id. at 284–85.  
 65 Id. at 269–72 (Raggi, J., concurring with denial of rehearing en banc) (“[I]f a district 
court’s decision to excuse a juror violates [Supreme Court precedent], it does so regardless of 
whether the voir dire occurred in a non-death penalty state such as Vermont, [or] a death 
penalty state such as Texas.”). 
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A. Using Local Community Standards to Measure Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
The student commentator who first identified the problem suggests the Eighth 
Amendment terms “cruel and unusual” should be construed in light of local values.66 
He rests his argument on prudential factors alone,67 and points out that local 
community values already inform at least one corner of the Bill of Rights—the First 
Amendment obscenity doctrine.68 Under that doctrine, what constitutes obscene 
material subject to state regulation depends on a community’s own standards.69  
The student commentator’s view would significantly restrict the ability of federal 
prosecutors to seek the federal death penalty. Of course, one might argue that 
subordinating federal authority to state policy in the area of death penalty 
prosecutions is not so great a loss for the federal government. After all, as discussed 
infra, states have traditionally played the primary role in prosecuting capital 
offenses. Although many federal capital prosecutions, however, involve offenses that 
could have been prosecuted by state officials, as Tsarnaev’s case shows, some do 
trigger strong federal interests. As discussed in Part IV, in some federal capital cases, 
the interest of the federal government in securing federal punishment is strong—
perhaps even stronger than the state’s interest in punishing.  
The proposed interpretation becomes even more problematic when one realizes it 
would have to apply to capital and non-capital sentences alike, as nothing in the 
Eighth Amendment’s text would support limiting its application to the death penalty. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that certain non-capital sentences, or the 
implementation thereof, can be so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.70 Unlike the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, however, this area of 
the law is underdeveloped, and the Court has not identified a coherent framework for 
determining when a sentence is or is not excessive and thus in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.71 Therefore, there is not much of a “federal floor” below which states 
                                                                                                                                          
 66 See Morton, supra note 17, at 1463–65.  
 67 See id. (arguing that a locality-based view of the Eighth Amendment is appropriate 
because “people in different states invariably express diverse attitudes as to what sanctions 
constitute ‘cruel and unusual punishment’” and because “[s]tates, as independent sovereigns, 
‘evolve’ at different rates”).  
 68 See id. at 1463 (“[J]ust as obscenity is reckoned with regard to ‘contemporary 
community standards,’ ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ should more properly be defined at the 
local level.”).  
 69 E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973). 
 70 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding that life sentence without parole 
for passing a counterfeit check after previously incurring three felony convictions was 
disproportionate and in violation of the Eighth Amendment); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences of life without 
parole for defendants who committed offenses while minors). But see Ewing v. California, 
538 U.S. 11, 29–31 (2003) (sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment for felony grand theft based 
on theft of golf clubs after defendant had previously been convicted of three felonies was not 
excessive under Eighth Amendment).  
 71 John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 900, 912 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
supported its view of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as imposing an 
excessiveness standard on both textual and historical grounds). 
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cannot go when it comes to determining the lengths of state prison sentences.72 As a 
result, under the proposed approach, novel proportionality challenges to state prison 
sentences would fail. A court would review any non-capital sentence that is not 
obviously excessive under the Supreme Court’s precedent only to determine whether 
the sentence conforms to that locality’s view of appropriate punishment. The inquiry 
would be little more than whether the sentence is lawful under the state’s sentencing 
law, because a reviewing court would assume the state law reflects state values. In 
short, judicial review of non-capital state sentences would be rendered obsolete, 
other than in the few areas where the Court has previously identified a state sentence 
as being excessive.  
While the proposed rule would create a hardship for state prisoners, it would also 
unintentionally benefit federal prisoners. If the Court adopted the proposed locality-
based interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, an individual 
could challenge a federal sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds by arguing that 
the sentence is significantly longer than the maximum authorized for like criminal 
conduct under the law of the state where the prisoner committed the crime. 
Presently, federal courts reject arguments that they must avoid disparities between 
state and federal sentencing schemes.73 The proposed interpretation, however, would 
require that federal courts either impose federal sentences that do not deviate from 
state sentencing law, or risk the sentence being invalidated as cruel and unusual 
because it exceeds what the community has determined to be an appropriate 
punishment. The problem would be even more pronounced in cases where a federal 
defendant is being sentenced for conduct a state has de-criminalized. In such 
instances, any federal punishment would be cruel and unusual.74 As a result, the 
substantive federal law—not just the federal sentencing statute—would be nullified 
within the state’s borders. Nullification would happen without any inquiry into 
whether the federal government has an interest in the consistent enforcement of 
                                                                                                                                          
 72 The only non-case specific rule that the Court has articulated regarding the 
proportionality of a non-capital sentence is the Graham rule – that a defendant cannot receive 
life without parole for a crime committed as a juvenile. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024. Thus, 
in all other cases, there is no federal constraint on what non-capital sentence a state may 
impose.  
 73 See United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 2012) (collecting cases); United 
States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o require parity in sentencing 
between state and federal defendants ‘would seriously undermine the goal of nationwide 
uniformity in the sentencing of similar defendants for similar federal offenses.’”) (citation 
omitted); United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 1110, 1112 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Adjusting federal 
sentences to conform to those imposed by the states where the offenses occurred would not 
serve the purposes of § 3553(a)(6), but, rather, would create disparities within the federal 
system, which is what § 3553(a)(6) is designed to discourage.”). 
 74 Consider a defendant being sentenced in federal court in Colorado for possession of less 
than fifty kilograms of marijuana. The defendant would be subject to a maximum federal 
sentence of five years’ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2012). However, under 
Colorado law, possession of such a quantity of marijuana is not a criminal offense. See COLO. 
CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. The defendant would argue that local values in Colorado dictate that 
any punishment for possession of marijuana is excessive, and therefore cruel and unusual. 
Under the proposed interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, the argument would likely have 
merit and the district court would be unable to sentence the defendant to prison for violation 
of federal law. 
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federal laws that is independent of a state’s interest in legalizing the conduct at 
issue.75  
B. Interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as a Restraint on 
Federal Power 
Professor Michael Mannheimer comes next with a more nuanced argument 
rooted in what he argues was the Framers’ intent behind the Eighth Amendment. 
Mannheimer contends the Bill of Rights’ criminal procedure provisions should be 
interpreted as their proponents, the Anti-Federalists, understood them.76 The Anti-
Federalists, Mannheimer argues, viewed these amendments as essential to preserving 
the traditional powers of the states by making “it more difficult for the federal 
government to investigate, prosecute, convict, and punish people for crime.”77 
Specifically, Mannheimer identifies the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments as “procedural hurdles” the Anti-Federalists threw “in the paths of 
federal investigators, prosecutors and judges because . . . the power to prosecute is 
the power to persecute.”78 Mannheimer then turns to the Eighth Amendment 
specifically and argues that the Anti-Federalists intended for it to “reserve to the 
States the authority to determine what kind of punishment, and how much, each type 
of transgression would merit.”79 Mannheimer ultimately concludes the interpretation 
most faithful to the Anti-Federalists’ purposes behind the Eighth Amendment, and 
                                                                                                                                          
 75 Consider the above marijuana hypothetical. In an October 2009 memorandum to all 
United States Attorneys, a Deputy Attorney General noted that prosecuting individuals whose 
actions were in compliance with state medical marijuana laws was “unlikely to be an efficient 
use of limited federal resources.” David Ogden, Memorandum for Selected United States 
Attorneys, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
documents/medical-marijuana.pdf. However, he also observed that federal prosecution of 
marijuana trafficking crimes may be appropriate when there are certain elements present 
including: unlawful use of firearms, violence, sales to minors, money laundering activity, 
illegal sales of other controlled substances, or ties to other criminal enterprises. Id. at 2–3. 
Under the proposed interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, any punishment would be 
inappropriate, even if the presence of one or more of these elements trigger federal interests.  
 76 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty is “Cruel and 
Unusual,” 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 849 (2006).  
 77 Id. He writes, “[c]lose scrutiny of the Anti-Federalists’ Bill of Rights reveals their 
profound concern with preserving state sovereignty as a means of furthering liberty. Though 
framed in terms of protecting the rights of individuals, the Bill of Rights was viewed in 1791 
as a barrier between the States and the national government.” Id. at 851. He further explains 
that his thesis “is not that the Bill of Rights was designed to protect collective rights rather 
than individual rights. To the contrary, the Anti-Federalists saw the two as fairly 
indistinguishable.” Id. at 853 (emphasis added); see also George C. Thomas, III, When 
Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal 
Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 156 (2001) (arguing that “the Bill of Rights is a 
profoundly antigovernment document that sought to impose restrictions on the federal 
government without regard to the innocence of particular defendants.”).  
 78 Mannheimer, supra note 76, at 857.  
 79 Id. at 864.  
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the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause specifically, is one that precludes federal 
punishment not permitted by the state in which the federal offense took place.80 
Mannheimer’s thesis is also flawed. Like the student’s argument, Mannheimer’s 
proposed approach is not constrained to capital cases. Rather, his reading of the 
Eighth Amendment would invalidate all federal punishment not authorized by the 
law of the state where an offense occurred.81 Unlike the student’s thesis, however, 
Mannheimer’s view is also not constrained to the Eighth Amendment. If the Eighth 
Amendment should be interpreted to constrain the federal government’s ability to 
prosecute crimes, then so should the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.82 
Specifically, a court should read them as tying federal investigative and prosecutorial 
capabilities to state practices and standards. Thus, a significant reorienting of the 
balance of police power between the federal and state governments would follow if 
courts adopted Mannheimer’s view.  
For example, if courts construed the Fourth Amendment as constraining federal 
investigators to exercising the investigative abilities of their state counterparts, a 
federal official would only be able to perform a warrantless search in a situation 
where an official of that state would be able to do likewise. Significant federal 
interests would be undermined. International border searches conducted by federal 
officers lacking probable cause83 would be unconstitutional, as state officials do not 
have a shared power to police international borders.84 Likewise, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), which authorizes warrants for electronic 
                                                                                                                                          
 80 Id. at 873–76 (arguing that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment “naturally offers an interpretation that retains for each State the ultimate authority 
to decide whether a mode of punishment such as the death penalty will be carried out within 
its borders.”).  
 81 In another article, Mannheimer actually espouses this very result. See Michael J. 
Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69 (2012). He 
contends that whether any federal punishment violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
proportionality principle should be determined by comparing the punishment to the 
punishment available for the same conduct under the law of the state where the conduct 
occurs. Id. at 123. Mannheimer argues that this would also be consistent with the Anti-
Federalists’ understanding of the Bill of Rights. See id. at 123–30. However, he does not 
consider the hypotheticals discussed infra involving federal offenses for conduct that is lawful 
under state law.  
 82 In fact, Mannheimer makes this very argument regarding the Fourth Amendment in a 
recent article. See Michael Z. Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment (Feb. 10, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2366486 (arguing that “at least from an originalist standpoint, the Fourth 
Amendment is best viewed as being largely contingent on state law.”).  
 83 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).  
 84 It is well settled that a border search is only valid if it is conducted pursuant to federal 
statutory authorization. See, e.g., People of Territory of Guam v. Villacrusis, 992 F.2d 886, 
887 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1990). 
Section 1581 of title 19 authorizes only customs officers to conduct border searches. Although 
courts have recognized that a border search is not invalid if it is conducted by a state official 
working in coordination with federal officials, for example, United States v. Ivey, 546 F.2d 
139, 143 (5th Cir. 1977), no court has recognized a state official’s free-standing authority to 
conduct a warrantless border search.  
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surveillance of foreign powers or their agents,85 would likely be invalidated. As 
amended, a FISA warrant can issue even when the primary purpose is not to obtain 
foreign intelligence information, but rather to obtain evidence in a criminal 
prosecution.86 State officials, however, cannot obtain FISA warrants.87 Thus, FISA 
confers on federal officials an investigatory tool state officials do not possess; the 
Fourth Amendment, as Mannheimer sees it, would render such a result 
unconstitutional. 
Reading the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel as a constraint on federal power 
would also be problematic when a district court considered a federal prisoner’s post-
conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland v. 
Washington’s88 two-part inquiry, a court reviewing an ineffectiveness claim first 
considers whether an attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable based on 
“the practice and expectations of the legal community.”89 With increased frequency 
in recent years, the Court has indicated that “the legal community” refers to the 
national defense bar, thus holding criminal defense attorneys to a national standard 
of care.90 Mannheimer’s version of the Sixth Amendment, however, would require 
displacing this national standard with one based on the common practices of defense 
attorneys within a state. In doing so, the Sixth Amendment would reserve for the 
states the power to determine the quality of legal representation a criminal defendant 
is entitled to. As a result, the constitutional right would lose its teeth in many cases. 
Nothing in Mannheimer’s proposal lends itself to federal courts creating “federal 
floor” for what constitutes reasonable performance.91 Thus, in a case where national 
professionalism standards require a defense attorney to do some act, but local custom 
shows that attorneys seldom actually do that thing, an attorney would not be held to 
have performed unreasonably when he acted in accordance with local custom. In 
                                                                                                                                          
 85 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–62 (2012).  
 86 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 728 (FISA Ct., 2002).  
 87 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2012) (“Each application for an order approving electronic 
surveillance under this subchapter shall be made by a Federal officer . . . .”).  
 88 466 U.S. 688 (1984).  
 89 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).  
 90 See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà vu All Over Again”: 
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the 
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 155–57 
(2007). The Court has looked to the American Bar Association’s guidelines and statements for 
discerning this national standard of care. See Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 at 366; Bobby v. Van 
Hook, 589 U.S. 4, 7 (2009) (“Restatements of professional standards, we have recognized, can 
be useful as ‘guides’ to what reasonableness entails.”); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 
(2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (“Counsel’s conduct . . . fell short of the 
standards for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)—
standards to which we have long referred as ‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’”); see 
also Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 691 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(observing that courts “have now adopted a national standard embodied in the ABA 
Guidelines” which was contrary to Strickland’s original language).  
 91 If federal courts created a minimal federal standard of reasonableness, then the Sixth 
Amendment would not reserve for the states the power to determine what constitutes 
minimally adequate performance.  
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other cases though, the Sixth Amendment would grow new teeth, as state practices 
can dictate a level of competency that exceeds what is common nationally. In either 
event—whether state practices exceed or fall below national standards—the state 
practices would be the standard against which an attorney’s performance is 
measured. The Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance would morph as a 
defendant crossed state lines.  
Other rights conferred by the Sixth Amendment would similarly vary in content 
from state to state. Under Mannheimer’s view, federal courts would have to conform 
to state laws that overlap with the Sixth Amendment’s criminal procedure 
protections when those state laws are more generous to defendants than the existing 
interpretations of the federal rights.92 Doing so would ensure federal prosecutors 
could not enjoy procedural advantages over state prosecutors. For example, the 
federal standard under the Speedy Trial Clause for when a federal trial must occur 
would become whatever is required under the law of the state within which a federal 
court sits.93 Currently, the Federal Speedy Trial Act94 requires that a defendant’s trial 
commence not later than seventy days after the filing of the indictment or 
information and not sooner than thirty days after the defendant’s initial court 
appearance.95 That federal statutory standard, however, would be rendered obsolete 
whenever a state law provided for a shorter period before trial, as the state 
requirement would become the federal constitutional standard.96  
                                                                                                                                          
 92 Stare decisis would keep in place Supreme Court precedent regarding the scopes of 
Sixth Amendment rights in federal courts where those interpretations are more generous to 
defendants than state law. For example, the Sixth Amendment grants a federal criminal 
defendant the right to conviction by a unanimous jury. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 
356, 380 (1998) (Powell, J., concurring). However, the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require the states to adhere to the unanimity requirement 
in criminal trials. See id. at 366. If a state authorized conviction based on a 10-2 verdict, for 
example, federal courts would not have to disturb settled federal precedent and do likewise. 
The point of Mannheimer’s thesis, as this Article understands it, is that the rights should be 
construed so as not to make federal prosecution an easier proposition than state prosecution. 
Therefore, when federal prosecutors are already required to clear greater prosecutorial hurdles 
than state prosecutors, Mannheimer’s thesis would not cause a change in the law.  
 93 Under current federal law, courts consider three factors to determine whether the 
Speedy Trial Clause has been violated: (1) the source of a delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; 
and (3) whether the defendant was prejudiced. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 48 (1970). 
If courts adopted Mannheimer’s view, these factors would not lose their relevance when a trial 
occurs before the period provided for under state law. However, when a defendant’s trial was 
delayed beyond the date provided for under state law, the defendant’s federal constitutional 
right would necessarily have been violated.  
 94 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2012).  
 95 Id. at § 3161(c)(1)–(2). 
 96 For example, under California law, a defendant charged with a felony must be tried 
within sixty days of arraignment absent “good cause to the contrary.” See CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1382(a)(2) (2014). Nevada’s Speedy Trial Act also provides a sixty-day period for 
prosecution. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.556 (1991). Under Mannheimer’s view, a federal 
defendant in California or Nevada would be per se deprived of his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial whenever his trial did not begin within sixty days of arraignment, regardless of 
whether his federal statutory speedy trial rights were also violated. See United States v. Loud 
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 304 n.1 (1986) (explaining that the Speedy Trial Clause and the Speedy 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment as only 
granting defendants a right to a jury trial when they are charged with “serious 
offenses,” defined as offenses punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment.97 
Some states, however, provide state constitutional rights to jury trials for all 
offenses, including “petty” offenses, to which the Court has previously held the 
Sixth Amendment right does not extend.98 Applying Mannheimer’s thesis, the 
federal standard for when the jury trial right applies would not be the six month 
threshold—it will be the practices of the state where the federal court sits. Where a 
state provides an absolute right to a jury trial, the federal court will have to do 
likewise. In any of these situations, the procedural rights of federal defendants would 
be the same as those of their state court counterparts.  
The same procedural rights of a federal defendant in one district, however, could 
be very different from those of a federal defendant in an adjacent district in a 
different state.99 Fundamentally unfair results would follow, as the same federal 
constitutional provision would provide greater protection to a defendant in one court, 
than it would to a defendant in another.100 These unequal outcomes in similar cases 
                                                                                                                                          
Trial Act confer distinct rights and require separate inquiries). However, the Court’s existing 
Speedy Trial Clause standard would remain in place whenever a defendant alleges that his 
Speedy Trial Clause rights were violated, although he was tried within the period required 
under state law.    
 97 E.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1996).  
 98 E.g., Woirhaye v. Montana Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., 972 P.2d 800, 802 (Mont. 1998) (“The 
guarantees of the Montana Constitution are plain on their face in that an accused has an 
absolute right to a trial by jury ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions.’”). 
 99 Administrative concerns also counsel against Mannheimer’s thesis. First, Mannheimer’s 
proposed rule would force federal judges to look to state law, with which they are unfamiliar, 
to perform one of their most important tasks—ensuring the federal constitutional rights are 
correctly applied. Second, Mannheimer does not explain what effect a change in state law 
would have on an already sentenced federal defendant.  
 100 See United States v. Wurzinger, 467 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Reducing a federal 
prisoner’s sentence to accord with that of a similarly situated state convict may decrease one 
sentencing disparity but simultaneously enlarges another: that between the federal convict and 
all similarly situated federal convicts.”); Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (“[A] single sovereign's laws should be applied equally to 
all . . . .”); see also Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal 
Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 
164 (2009) (“Making federal rights and protections available in principle to the nation as a 
whole, but in actuality having them rely on one’s particular geographic location within the 
nation, raises obvious fairness concerns.”). One student commentator recently pointed out that 
this problem would specifically follow Judge Calabresi’s view of the vicinage provision, 
writing that  
[a]llowing a district court judge to sit a juror who categorically opposes the 
application of federal sentencing law on the basis of state legislation that abolishes 
capital punishment would, in effect, make the penalty phase of capital trials dependent 
on local law. By replacing consistent rules with expanding uncertainty, the resulting 
patchwork of districts with and without the death penalty would exacerbate the unjust 
sentencing disparities that Congress has repeatedly attempted to ameliorate.  
Miguel A. Lopez, Note, Federalism by Jury in Untied States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 
2009), 33 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y. 375, 383 (2010). 
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run counter to the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection, applicable 
to the federal government through the reverse incorporation doctrine.101 Therefore, 
even if the Anti-Federalist interpretation had merit at the time of ratification, it was 
displaced by the Reconstruction-era amendment, requiring that similarly situated 
criminal defendants enjoy similar legal rights. Furthermore, from a pragmatic 
standpoint, Mannheimer’s version of the Eighth Amendment would greatly hinder 
and make unpredictable all types of federal prosecutions in all jurisdictions.  
In short, the Eighth Amendment is not the solution to the problem of the federal 
death penalty in non-death penalty jurisdictions. The provision cannot be implied to 
invalidate federal death sentences in non-death penalty states without disturbing 
other important areas of the law, creating disparate outcomes between all types of 
similarly situated federal defendants (not just those facing capital charges), and 
greatly impeding valid federal law enforcement objectives. What is needed is a 
doctrinal solution supported, rather than foreclosed, by the Supreme Court’s 
precedent; one that is narrowly crafted to preclude only federal death penalty 
prosecutions when the state where the offense occurred has no death penalty, and 
there is no prevailing, distinctly federal, interest in the prosecution. Windsor 
provides just such a doctrinal framework.  
IV. A NEW APPROACH: UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR’S BROAD APPLICATIONS  
In Windsor, the Court held that DOMA was unconstitutional because it impeded 
on a liberty interest, or right, protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.102 The novel aspect of Windsor was the holding that a state law right can be 
fundamental and thereby protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
In such cases, federal interference with the state law right is reviewed like federal 
interference with an unenumerated right created by the due process provision 
itself.103  
The merits analysis portion of the opinion in Windsor, written by Justice 
Kennedy, consisted of four parts. First, the opinion discussed the fact that New York 
had conferred on its citizens a right to same-sex marriage. The right’s status under 
state law and its significance to those who exercise it apparently made the New York 
same-sex marriage right a fundamental one protected by the Fifth Amendment.104 
Second, Justice Kennedy emphasized that by conferring the right, the state had acted 
in an area traditionally reserved for near-exclusive state regulation.105 In the third 
                                                                                                                                          
 101 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954) (“But the concepts of equal 
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not 
mutually exclusive . . . . [D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due 
process.”).  
 102 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 103 See Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY, available at http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/26/federalism-marries-liberty-in-
the-doma-decision/ (June 26, 2013). Professor Barnett, one of the federalism scholars who 
submitted an amicus brief in Windsor, writes that Windsor was the first time that the Court 
had used state law “to identify a protected liberty or right within its borders against a federal 
statute.” Id.   
 104 133 S. Ct. at 2689, 2692. 
 105 Id. at 2689-92.  
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part, the majority turned to DOMA and explained how the federal statute interfered 
with the state law right.106 Fourth, the Court held that because the federal 
government had interfered with an important state law right arising in an area 
traditionally controlled by the states, DOMA was subject to increased Fifth 
Amendment scrutiny—apparently heightened rational basis review.107 DOMA failed 
this scrutiny because, when Congress enacted the statute, animus towards the ability 
of homosexuals to enter into state-recognized marriages had motivated its action.108  
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy never acknowledged the Court was 
applying substantive due process review based on interference with an extra-textual 
right. In fact, the opinion included language suggesting the Court’s outcome rested 
as much on a denial of equal protection, as it did on the denial of a substantive due 
process right.109 Justice Kennedy observed that DOMA identified “a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and ma[de] them unequal.” He also labeled the statute’s 
principal purpose as “to impose inequality.”110 These references to DOMA’s 
discriminatory effect, however, did not convert Windsor into an equal protection 
decision. Contrary to what these statements suggest, the Court could not have rested 
its decision on either equal protection or substantive due process principles. The 
equal protection aspect of the discussion was ancillary to and necessarily followed 
the Court’s due process holding. As explained in Part IV, DOMA discriminated not 
between homosexual and heterosexual people; rather, it distinguished between those 
who wished to exercise a state law right to same-sex marriage, and those who did 
not. This point is important because it means whenever due process scrutiny applies 
based on federal interference with a state law right, the federal action will have 
necessarily discriminated. The federal government will have burdened those citizens 
who exercise the state law right, and not burdened those who do not. Absent a state 
law right entitled to due process protection, no constitutionally impermissible 
discrimination can occur.111   
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy’s failure to announce he was applying substantive 
due process review is troubling. In dissent, Justice Scalia suggested Justice Kennedy 
had refrained from doing so because a right to same-sex marriage did not fit into 
either of the tradition-based categories of fundamental rights the Court previously 
identified as both arising under the due process provisions and triggering substantive 
due process review.112 Justice Kennedy did not argue with him on this point. Had the 
                                                                                                                                          
 106 Id. at 2692-95. 
 107 Id. at 2693-96.  
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at 2693 (holding that DOMA “violates basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the Federal Government.”).   
 110 Id. at 2694.  
 111 Moreover, the parts of the opinion discussed closely track the Court’s standard due 
process framework. For example, Justice Kennedy provided a “careful description” of the 
asserted liberty interest—the state law right to same-sex marriage. See Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“Our established method of substantive-due-process 
analysis has two primary features . . . . we have required in substantive-due-process cases a 
‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”).  
 112 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 
721).  
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Windsor majority held a right to same-sex marriage arises under the Fifth 
Amendment (and thus the Fourteenth Amendment as well), then Windsor would 
have little precedential value outside the same-sex marriage context, but would have 
invalidated all state provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage.  
The Court did not do this. It did not hold that anything inherent about same-sex 
marriage creates an unenumerated right under the Due Process Clauses themselves. 
Importantly, the asserted right to same-sex marriage did not arise from the Due 
Process Clauses at all, but rather from state law.113 Nevertheless, the right’s 
importance—to the state and to the state’s citizens—entitled the right to substantive 
due process protection.114 Thus, the Windsor Court broke new ground by delinking 
the dual aspects of the substantive due process doctrine. It recognized an 
unenumerated right can arise from some source other than the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments, yet still be protected under those provisions’ substantive prongs. In 
essence, the majority recognized a third category of fundamental rights entitled to 
due process protection—fundamental personal rights created under state law in areas 
traditionally regulated by states.  
Importantly, applying heightened scrutiny to deprivations of rights that exist only 
under state law avoids one of the criticisms of the substantive due process doctrine. 
Scholars have objected to substantive due process on the grounds that the doctrine 
results in unelected judges relying on their subjective value choices to invalidate 
                                                                                                                                          
 113 Prior to Windsor, the Court had looked to state law, generally, to determine whether 
there was a sufficient tradition behind a right in order for the right to be a fundamental one 
arising under the Due Process Clauses. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not give rise to a substantive due process right to physician-
assisted suicide because the “considered policy choice of almost every State” rejected such a 
right); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (holding that a criminal defendant enjoyed a 
substantive due process right to have his guilt determined beyond a reasonable doubt in part 
because of “unanimous adherence to the reasonable doubt standard in common law 
jurisdictions”). However, the Court had not looked to the law of any one state and found a 
right entitled to substantive due process protection. Rather, it had looked to the law of all of 
the states collectively and found evidence (or a lack thereof) that a right was rooted in 
tradition, and therefore present under the Federal Constitution. The Court’s previous decisions 
left open the possibility that a majority of states could come to a consensus and make their 
views federal constitutional law. See Carrie Leonetti, Counting Heads: Does the Existence of 
a National Consensus Give Rise to a Substantive Due Process Right To a Particular Criminal 
Procedure?, 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 317 (2011) (arguing that consensus among most states 
about a state criminal procedure right should be binding on all states and the federal 
government pursuant to substantive due process). Unlike those cases, the Windsor approach 
does not invite federal courts to decree a national standard binding against the states (which, 
albeit, might be based on collective state consensus). It simply allows the states (as individual 
states) to make their own standards binding on the federal government.   
 114 Professor Ernie Young argues that Windsor rested primarily on equal protection 
grounds. However, he contends that the federal government’s discrimination was invalid 
because it caused a state law right to be available to some citizens, but not to others. 
According to Professor Young, it was the fundamental nature of this state law right which 
protected it from federal interference: “[t]he right of ‘recognition’ in Windsor, then, was not 
some untethered judicial creation, but rather an entitlement to federal recognition of state law 
rights created in the democratic exercise of states’ reserved powers. That right is utterly 
familiar—and fundamental.” Ernest A. Young, Essay, United States v. Windsor and the Role 
of State Law in Defining Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV. 39, 47 (2013).  
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legislative action.115 The Court, however, did not do this in Windsor, and applying 
Windsor prospectively will not lead to such anti-democratic problems. Rather, the 
Windsor Court established a framework whereby, when two sovereign entities have 
made conflicting, mutually exclusive policy choices about a single issue, the policy 
choice of the entity traditionally tasked with regulating the field receives deference. 
Therefore, Windsor did not run counter to democratic values—it enhanced the effect 
of local democratic choices.  
Windsor was novel because the Court relied on the individual rights guarantees 
of the Fifth Amendment, rather than the federalism requirements of the Tenth 
Amendment to enforce deference to state policymaking. By recognizing that the 
federal government can be constrained from interfering with a right that exists only 
under state law, the Court opened the door for individuals to pursue claims based on 
federal interference with state law rights, even when the federal action is not in 
excess of enumerated powers or an invalid interference with state sovereignty.  
 Like any new legal doctrine, the parameters of the Windsor framework will be 
determined through application to new facts. A right to not be executed by the state 
is, as this Article argues, one type of state law right entitled to protection from 
federal interference. The remainder of this Article considers what a Windsor-based 
challenge to the federal death penalty might look like. It explains why Windsor 
could prevent the federal government from executing for crimes committed in non-
death penalty states where there is no strong federal interest in prosecuting for the 
offense. It also addresses why a Windsor-based solution to the problem set forth in 
Part I would avoid the overbreadth problems that would result from the previously 
proposed solutions described in Part II.  
 V. A HYPOTHETICAL WINDSOR-BASED CHALLENGE TO THE  
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 
Currently, eighteen states (as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) 
do not have the death penalty.116 The following considers how a federal defendant 
might challenge a prosecutor’s attempt to subject him to the federal death penalty by 
pointing to the lack of that punishment under the law of his state. It does so through 
the lens of a Windsor-based pre-trial motion to dismiss a notice of intent to seek the 
federal death penalty.  
                                                                                                                                          
 115 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 387, 433 n.217 (“Early Supreme Court decisions striking down legislation under 
economic substantive due process, and more recent decisions striking down state regulation 
interfering with individual autonomy, have been criticized as undemocratic intervention by the 
Court in contravention of the will of the majority.”) (collecting sources).  
 116 Non-death penalty jurisdictions include: Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.  
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A. The Existence of a Fundamental State Law Right to Not Be Executed  
The first step of the Windsor Court’s analysis was concluding that: (1) the state 
had conferred a personal, noneconomic right on its citizens;117 and (2) that right was 
fundamental in nature.118 By reaching these conclusions, Justice Kennedy tethered 
this new type of right protected under substantive due process—a right created by 
state law—to the existing substantive due process rights arising from the Fifth 
Amendment itself. Only alleged deprivations of fundamental personal rights are 
reviewed under substantive due process scrutiny.119 Therefore, in the hypothetical 
Windsor-based challenge, the defendant will need to establish these same two 
criteria—that there exists a personal state law right to not be executed, and that such 
a right is fundamental.120 
1. The State Conferred a Personal Right to Not be Executed  
As for the first required showing, the defendant will have to concede the 
existence of the state law right to not be executed is not as straightforward as the 
existence of a state law right to same-sex marriage. In Windsor, the Court readily 
concluded New York’s Marriage Equality Act—opening with the statement 
“Marriage is a fundamental human right. Same-sex couples should have the same 
                                                                                                                                          
 117 To reach this conclusion, Justice Kennedy discussed the definition of the right being 
asserted, stating:  
For same-sex couples who wished to be married, the State acted to give their lawful 
conduct a lawful status. This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the 
intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the Sate worthy of 
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages. It reflects both the 
community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of 
marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality. 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692-93 (2013). 
 118 As discussed, infra, Justice Kennedy implicitly required fundamentality by stressing 
both the right’s categorical importance and evidence that New Yorkers valued the right, based 
on the broad public participation in its creation.  Id. at 2692.  
 119 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  
 120 The defendant will, of course, first need to define the right as a state law right not to be 
executed, just as Justice Kennedy defined the state law right and thus established that it was a 
personal one. See Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  Importantly, in 
defining the right, the defendant will need to emphasize that the right asserted arises from 
state law, not from the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of life or liberty. The Court has 
previously rejected defendants’ invitations to apply heightened due process scrutiny in the 
criminal law context. However, it has done so when the defendant asserted that the right arose 
from the Fifth Amendment itself. See United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) 
(explaining that “[e]very person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the 
Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees.”). 
Specifically relevant here, lower federal courts have rejected Fifth Amendment, substantive 
due process, challenges to the FDPA.  United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 61–70 (2d Cir. 
2002) (rejecting claim based on substantive due process right to possibility of exoneration 
during natural life); United States v. Tisdale, No. 07–10142–05–JTM, 2008 WL 5156426, at 
*2 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2008). Thus, it will be important for the defendant to distinguish his 
claimed state law right from one that arises directly under the Federal Constitution.   
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access as others to the protections, responsibilities, rights, obligations, and benefits 
of civil marriage”121—conferred a personal right.122 When abolishing the death 
penalty, however, states have generally not included an explicit link between 
voluntarily restraining the state’s ability to impose a particular type of punishment 
and conferring an individual right. No state has explicitly conferred a personal right 
to not be subjected to state-sponsored execution. Instead, most states have abolished 
capital punishment simply by repealing the portions of statutes that previously 
authorized such a sanction.123 Moreover, states have abolished capital punishment for 
reasons other than benefitting those convicted of crimes, such as evidence that the 
death penalty does not serve a strong deterrent purpose, or the death penalty’s high 
costs.124 Thus, the defendant will likely have to acknowledge that, although he is 
benefitted by the state’s abolition of the death penalty—as a result of the state action, 
the state cannot execute him—the state may not have intended to bestow a right 
upon him by abolishing the death penalty.  
This concession will not doom the defendant’s challenge, however. First, the 
defendant will point out that the Windsor Court’s analysis regarding the existence of 
a state law right will apply with equal force when a state recognizes same-sex 
marriage simply by repealing the legal prohibitions on doing so. As a second 
argument, the defendant will point to the unique life or death nature of the death 
penalty, and argue that a state’s decision to not execute its citizens, regardless of 
whether that decision results in an explicit individual right, necessarily bestows a 
new liberty on individuals in that state. By abolishing the death penalty, a state 
allows its citizens to act with the assurance that the state will seek to preserve their 
lives, no matter what they do, or are suspected of doing. Put differently, whether or 
                                                                                                                                          
 121 Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Laws 749 (codified at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 10-a, 
10-b, 13 (2013)).  
 122 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“New York . . . decided that same-sex couples should have 
the right to marry and so live with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of 
equality with all other married persons.”).  
 123 See, e.g., S.B. 276, 2013 Leg. Sess. (Md. 2013); S.B. 280, 2012 Sess. (Conn. 2012); 
H.B. 285, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009). Michigan is the only state to have made the lack of 
the death penalty a matter of state constitutional law. However, the Michigan Constitution 
states only that “[n]o law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death”; and that 
provision is located in Article IV, entitled “Legislative Branch,” not Article I, entitled 
“Declaration of Rights.” MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 46. The language and location of the 
Michigan provision suggest that, although Michigan gave elevated status to its abolition of 
capital punishment, it did not do so because it viewed the abolition as the conferral of an 
individual right.  
 124 For example, in Maryland, the state senate voted to abolish capital punishment after a 
commission appointed to study the issue reported that the death penalty did not accomplish its 
deterrent purpose, was costlier than a life sentence, and risked executing the innocent. See 
Editorial, Flawed ‘Compromise’, BALT. SUN, Mar. 5, 2009, at 20A. In Connecticut, the 
Hartford Courant reported that death penalty repeal supporters gave the following reasons for 
their position to a legislative committee: “the enormous amount of time it takes to execute a 
prisoner . . .the painful toll that endless appeals take on the families of murder victims, 
instances of racial bias in implementing the death penalty and the fact that a mistake can lead 
to the execution of an innocent person.” Daniela Altimari, Committee OK’s Death Penalty 
Repeal Bill, Which Calls for Maximum Sentence of Life Without Parole, Heads Next to House, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 13, 2011, at B6.  
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not the state intends for this result, abolition of capital punishment necessarily entails 
the conferral of an absolute right to the preservation of one’s life versus the state. 
Thus, the defendant will maintain, it is immaterial whether the state announces in its 
constitution or a statute that all citizens enjoy a personal right to not be executed. 
Abolition of the death penalty, standing alone, is sufficient to confer this right.  
2. The State Law Right to Not Be Executed is Fundamental  
As for the second requirement—the right’s fundamentality—in Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized that the state law right to same-sex marriage came to exist after 
“a statewide deliberative process that enabled [New York] citizens to discuss and 
weigh arguments for and against same-sex marriage.”125 Justice Kennedy did not 
explicitly state why the way the state conferred the right mattered. One possible 
explanation is that the “statewide deliberative process” was what made the right a 
fundamental one protected by the Fifth Amendment from federal interference.  
This explanation makes sense. A court considering whether an asserted 
unenumerated right arises from the Due Process Clauses looks to the substantive 
nature of the right. The Court does so to determine whether the substance of the 
asserted right necessarily arises from the Constitution’s inherent protection of 
liberty.126 If it does, then the inherent constitutional protection of liberty extends to 
the asserted right, and requires heightened scrutiny of governmental action abridging 
the right.127 In Windsor, however, the asserted right to same-sex marriage arose from 
state law—not the Federal Constitution. Thus, it was not the Constitution’s 
protection of liberty that extended to cover the right: It was the Constitution’s 
implicit requirement of respect for state policymaking that caused the right to receive 
Fifth Amendment protection. If this is so, then it would make little sense for a 
federal court to reserve for itself the role of evaluating the substantive nature of a 
state law right to determine whether the asserted right is protected. By stressing the 
way the state created the same-sex marriage right, rather than evaluating the 
qualitative aspects of the right, the Windsor Court left it to states to determine 
whether a state law right is important enough to receive Fifth Amendment 
protection. Windsor suggests when a state intentionally confers a personal right 
through some political process that involves a high-degree of public participation, 
then the very act of conferring the right makes it a fundamental one protected by the 
Fifth Amendment (provided the second step is satisfied—that the right arises in an 
area traditionally regulated by states).  
At the same time, Windsor is notable for what it did not do. The Court did not 
leave room for future challenges to DOMA in which a court would consider the 
means by which some other state created a same-sex marriage right. Although just 
before the Court decided DOMA, eleven states (and the District of Columbia) 
                                                                                                                                          
 125 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“New York acted to enlarge the definition of marriage to 
correct what its citizens and elected representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had 
not earlier known or understood.”) (citing Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Laws 749 
(codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW  §§ 10-a, 10-b, 13 (2013)).  
 126 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (explaining that the rights 
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are only those that are “at the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” in light of “the meaning, the essential 
implications of, liberty itself”).  
 127 See id.  
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recognized same-sex marriages, not all of them did so as a result of a “statewide 
deliberative process” like the one that occurred in New York. Instead, there were 
states where same-sex marriage gained legally protected status as a result of judicial 
decisions, some of which were deeply unpopular.128 In those states, a court might 
have paused before concluding the importance of the right to the state and its citizens 
gave rise to federal constitutional protection. After Windsor, however, DOMA was 
void nationally—even in states where the means of conferring the state law right to 
same-sex marriage suggested public disregard for the right.  
This aspect of the opinion is analytically troubling. If it is for states to determine 
for themselves the prominence of a state law right, then the fact that a right is 
important in one state should not mean a substantially identical right existing under 
the law of another state is per se prominent. Nevertheless, the majority’s not 
requiring a state-specific analysis each time a state recognizes same-sex marriage 
was pragmatic. First, it avoided the unseemly result of federal law recognizing same-
sex marriages existing under one state’s law but not recognizing those that exist 
under the law of another state. Not only would such a result have raised fairness 
concerns, it would also have led to uncertainty in the administration of federal law. 
Moreover, if a state-specific assessment of the right’s importance was needed, a 
court might have determined that, although a right to same-sex marriage was 
important when it was created, its status under state law had shifted. All of these 
outcomes would have run counter to the individual-right affirming spirit of the 
opinion.  
Thus, the Windsor Court apparently adopted an analysis whereby, to determine 
whether an asserted state law right is fundamental and thus protected by the Fifth 
Amendment (even though it arises under state law), a court looks to the means by 
which a state—any state, that is—created the right. If a state intentionally bestowed 
an individual right through a prominent political process, then the very act of 
creating the right establishes its fundamentality.  
As for the second issue, the defendant will point to the means by which five 
states recently abolished capital punishment and argue the events in those states 
resembled the “deliberative process” that led to New York’s same-sex marriage 
right. Within the past six years, New Jersey,129 New Mexico, 130 Illinois,131 
Connecticut,132 and Maryland133 have all abolished the death penalty through 
                                                                                                                                          
 128 Consider states like Massachusetts, California, Iowa, and Connecticut, each of which 
recognize same-sex marriages as a result of opinions by state supreme courts. See Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008); Kerrigan 
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The state courts’ decisions in those cases did not follow any 
public involvement or “statewide deliberative process.” In fact, in Iowa and California there 
was strong public backlash to the courts’ decisions. Californians responded to the judicially-
created same-sex marriage right with Proposition 8, nullifying the court’s decision. Iowans 
responded by unseating several of the state supreme court justices who had signed on to the 
opinion. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 3, 2010, at A1.  
 129 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2007).  
 130 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (West 2009).  
 131 See S.B. 3539, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011).  
 132 See Pub. Act No. 12-5 (Conn. 2012).  
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legislation that followed visible political campaigns, much like the campaign that led 
to New York’s recognition of same-sex marriages.134 The events occurring in those 
states will, standing alone, be enough to establish that a state law right to not be 
executed is a fundamental one whenever it exists under state law. This is true 
regardless of whether the state where the challenge occurs abolished capital 
punishment recently or long ago;135 or whether it did so via a judicial decision or 
legislative action.136 Even if the challenge occurs in a non-death penalty state other 
than the five that recently abolished capital punishment, Windsor makes clear that 
the right’s continued existence under state law establishes that federalism is 
enhanced by federal observance of the right.137 
                                                                                                                                          
 133 See S.B. 276, 2013 Leg. Sess. (Md. 2013).  
 134 See Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1240–41 
(2013); see also Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and 
the American Death Penalty Regime in the Twenty-First Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797, 820–33 
(2012) (describing the political movements that culminated in the abolition of the death 
penalty in New Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois). For example, in Maryland, the governor 
made death penalty repeal a centerpiece of his legislative agenda, just as New York’s 
governor made the passage of the Marriage Equality Act a centerpiece of his. See Michael 
Dresser, O’Malley to Lead Move to Repeal Death Penalty, BALT. SUN, Jan. 15, 2013, at 2A; 
Michael Barbaro & Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo Vows Personal Push to Legalize Gay 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at A25.  
 135 Five states repealed their death penalty laws during the decades immediately before 
Furman (and did not subsequently reinstate them). These states include: Alaska (abolishing in 
1957, two years before its admission to the union, see Melissa S. Green, A History of the 
Death Penalty in Alaska, Justice Center, University of Alaska at Anchorage, available at 
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/death/alaska/history.html); Hawaii (abolishing in 1957 while still 
a territory); Vermont (abolishing in 1964); Iowa (abolishing in 1965); and West Virginia 
(abolishing in 1965). See Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to 
Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2011). Four states 
abolished the death penalty between 1853 and 1911: Michigan (abolishing in 1846); 
Wisconsin (abolishing in 1853); Maine (abolishing in 1887); and Minnesota (abolishing in 
1911). See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 116.  
 136 State court decisions in Rhode Island and New York first repealed those states’ death 
penalty statutes. See State v. Cline, 397 A.2d 1309, 1311 (R.I. 1979) (holding that state’s 
mandatory death penalty statute was unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment); People v. 
LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 350 (N.Y. 2004) (state death penalty statute requiring jury deadlock 
instruction violated state and federal constitutional due process rights and thus rendered death 
penalty statute unconstitutional). Moreover, the legislatures in both states subsequently 
formally repealed the unconstitutional statutes. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 
2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1987).   
 137 Recent history in one state will challenge this presumption of fundamentality. In 2006, 
Wisconsin voters supported reinstating the death penalty by a margin of 56 percent to 44 
percent in a non-binding, advisory referendum. Gina Barton, Wisconsin Voters Lean Toward 
Death Penalty, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Nov. 11, 2006. However, the referendum results 
did not spark legislative action, and since then there has been little effort to reintroduce capital 
punishment. Jason Stein, Don’t Look for Death Penalty Soon in Wisconsin, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 
28, 2007. Nevertheless, the vote followed a public campaign during which groups on both 
sides of the issue stirred strong public sentiment. E.g., Jocelyn Berkham, Death Penalty 
Question Causes Stir Among Voters, WAUSAU DAILY HERALD, Nov. 5, 2006, at A1. Therefore, 
in Wisconsin, there is some possibility that respecting the state law right to not be executed 
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B. The Right Not to Be Executed Exists in an Area Traditionally Regulated by States 
Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the states’ traditional roles in defining legally 
recognized marriages makes clear that applying due process scrutiny will only be 
appropriate if the fundamental right to not be executed arises in an area traditionally 
regulated primarily by states. In Windsor, evidence of states’ traditional primacy in 
the area of marital relations included: (1) the importance to state domestic relations 
law of statutes defining criteria for marriage recognition;138 and (2) the long history 
of federal deference to state authority in the field of domestic relations.139 Similar 
elements are present here.  
As for this first principle, the ability to define punishments for violent offenses is 
central to giving effect to a state’s general interests in criminal punishment. 140 From 
a retributivist perspective, a state’s interest in affixing on an individual what it 
considers the appropriate type of punishment is at its height when the individual took 
the life of another. 141 In a 1947 case, Justice Frankfurter explained in a concurrence 
why the Court, from a prudential standpoint, should not intervene to stop a state 
from carrying out an execution. He wrote, “this Court must abstain from interference 
                                                                                                                                          
might actually offend the majority of the population. However, a court should not accept this 
argument. The fact that the institutional constraints placed by the state’s citizens on the 
development of state policy have not led to the reintroduction of capital punishment suggests 
that the right to not be executed continues to demand respect.  
 138 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (“The recognition of civil 
marriages is central to state domestic relations law applicable to its residents and citizens . . . 
The definition of marriage is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the 
subject of domestic relations . . . ”).  
 139 Id. (“Consistent with this allocation of authority, the Federal Government, through our 
history, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.”).  
 140 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (“The promotion of safety of persons 
and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power.”); see also McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 30 S. Ct. 3020, 3113–14 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ability to respond to the social ills associated with dangerous weapons goes to the very 
core of the States’ police powers.”).  
 141 See Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, 
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 764 (2005). Professor Steiker 
writes,  
When the government executes, it is not merely “killing” (though of course it is doing 
that); it is engaging in a distinctive governmental practice that we call criminal 
punishment, which involves the deliberate infliction of unpleasant consequences in 
response to an offender's wrongdoing. This purposefulness is one of the defining 
features of criminal punishment as a practice, along with the public affixing of blame 
and the solicitation of certain emotions, such as shame (on the part of the punished) 
and condemnation (on the part of the public). These features of punishment explain 
why it is viewed not merely as regulation by other means but rather as a problematic 
practice that requires some special justification. Being an act done by the state in the 
name of the collective, it requires not only moral but also political justification: we 
would appropriately characterize improper executions as not only morally wrong but 
also unjust. 
Id.  
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with State action no matter how strong one’s personal feeling of revulsion against a 
State’s insistence on its pound of flesh.”142 It was not the nature of the penalty that 
mandated deference; it was the state’s interest in punishing for the crime and giving 
effect to its own retributive interest. That interest in retribution is as strong when the 
state seeks to impose a sanction other than death.143 Punishing for the most severe 
crimes is also crucial to fulfilling the state’s interest in deterrence. If legally 
authorized punishments for the most severe offenses do not serve their deterrent 
purpose, then violent crimes will occur. Studies suggest an increase in violent crime 
often is accompanied by an increase in other crimes.144 Therefore, deterring the most 
severe offenses is essential to protecting citizens from all crime.  
Consistent with the states’ interests in accomplishing their penological 
objectives, the federal government defers to the states when it comes to prosecuting 
and punishing violent offenders. In an 1821 decision, Chief Justice Marshall 
declared that, although Congress may punish for murders committed on federal 
property, it possesses “no general right to punish murder committed within any of 
the States.”145 Since then, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the primacy of state law 
when it comes to defining and punishing for violent crimes.146  
                                                                                                                                          
 142 State ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470-71 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). In Francis, the Court rejected a Louisiana death row inmate’s challenge to the 
state’s second attempt to execute him after a malfunction of the electrocution device at the 
first attempt. Id. at 465–66.  
 143 See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of 
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 407, 464–68 
(2005) (explaining that capital punishment offends the dignity of the accused and the society 
as a whole, and, a retributivist has an interest in refraining from imposing death as 
punishment) (“Opposition to the death penalty arises, then, not only because of our 
fundamental commitment to respect the basic dignity of the offender, notwithstanding his past 
offense, but also our own dignity . . . . [H]uman dignity is a value whose strength in the moral 
life is more vividly experienced the more vigilant we are in protecting and nurturing it.”).  
 144 See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson, Escalating the War on Drugs: Causes and Unintended 
Consequences, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 293, 337 (2009) (noting that “there is an inverse 
relationship between drug control and both property and violent crime rates”); Joan McCord, 
Confounding Factors and Fictions of Counting, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 927, 943 (1998) 
(suggesting that the causes of nonviolent crimes are also “among the necessary causes of 
violent crimes”); Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate 
Sentencing: The Truth About Truth-In-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509, 529 (2002) 
(noting that “violent and property crime rates tend to move in the same direction.”); Kristen 
Bolden, Note, DNA Fabrication, A Wake Up Call: The Need to Reevaluate the Admissibility 
and Reliability of DNA Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 409, 417 n.62 (2011) (noting that 
studies show “a high recidivism rate for individuals who commit nonviolent crimes and then 
progress to commit violent crimes” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 145 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821). Although the first Congress 
enacted a murder statute, it limited the effect of that statute to areas “under the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 3, reprinted in 2 Annals 
of Cong. 2215 (1970). A similar provision now exists in the United States Code. See 18 
U.S.C. § 1111 (2012).  
 146 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“Indeed, we can think of no 
better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and 
reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”) 
(holding that the federal statute authorizing a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated 
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The Windsor Court provided specific examples of federal deference to state 
regulation of domestic relations. Similar examples exist when it comes to federal 
deference to state prosecution of violent crime. Justice Kennedy noted that federal 
courts, as a prudential matter, decline to hear cases otherwise arising under diversity 
jurisdiction, involving domestic relations.147 Similarly, the Justice Department’s 
Petite Policy requires authorization from the appropriate Assistant Attorney General 
before a federal prosecutor commences a federal prosecution based on conduct for 
which a state court has already tried an individual.148 This practice, although not 
required by the Double Jeopardy Clause or statute, ensures that, for most crimes 
punishable under state law, federal officials will defer to their state counterparts.149 
The Capital Case Protocols, even after the recent amendments, work in tandem with 
the Petite Policy and counsel federal deference to state prosecutions for violent 
crimes. They require that federal prosecutors, before charging a federal offense 
punishable by death, consider whether there is a “substantial federal interest” in the 
prosecution. When specific factors indicate a state’s interests are stronger, federal 
prosecution—seeking the death penalty or some lesser sanction—is inappropriate.150 
Thus, just as a discretionary doctrine ensures domestic relations matters stay out of 
federal courts, a discretionary federal practice ensures most violent crimes are 
prosecuted in state, rather than federal, court.151 
                                                                                                                                          
violence exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers in part because preventing violent crimes is 
traditionally regulated by states); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) 
(“[T]he structure and limitations of federalism . . . allow the States great latitude under their 
police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of 
all persons.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (construing the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act as not regulating the practice of medicine generally, because that area was one 
traditionally regulated by the states)); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 S. Ct. 
1949, 1982 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Absent congressional action that is in 
accordance with, or necessary and proper to, an enumerated power, the duty to protect citizens 
from violent crime, including acts of sexual violence, belongs solely to the States.”).  
 147 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (citing Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)).  
 148 See Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional 
Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 851–54 (2009) (describing the Petite Policy as requiring 
deference to state prosecution unless the federal interest is strong or the state outcome was 
unsatisfying). Notably, the Petite Policy applies to constrain federal prosecution, even where 
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not do so. Id. at 851-52. 
 149 See Little, supra note 16, at 414–15.  
 150 U.S. ATT’YS MANUAL at 9-10.010 (2014). Factors relevant in determining whether the 
federal interest outweighs the state interest in prosecution include: (1) characteristics of the 
offense, including the identity of the offender, victim, and primary investigators; (2) extent to 
which the criminal conduct was interstate in nature; and (3) ability and willingness of the state 
to prosecute effectively. Id. 
 151 Federal deference to state criminal proceedings also extends to the federal judiciary. 
The federal habeas corpus statute, as amended, significantly limits the instances when a 
federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner—doing so in an effort to 
promote federalism. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 
1388, 1401 (2011) (provision limiting district court’s discretion to consider new evidence 
“carries out [statute’s] goal of promoting comity, finality, and federalism by giving state 
 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
132 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:101 
Additionally, Justice Kennedy noted that federal statutes, like the Copyright Act, 
look to state domestic relations law to determine relationships having legal 
significance under federal law.152 Similarly, federal criminal statutes incorporate 
state criminal law. Many federal statutes include felony recidivist provisions, which 
allow for punishment whenever an individual commits a prohibited act after having 
been convicted of a felony offense—either under state or federal law.153 Federal law 
does provide a standard definition of a felony—a crime punishable by more than one 
year imprisonment.154 To determine whether a state offense was punishable by more 
than one year imprisonment, however, federal courts do not consider the penalty an 
individual would have faced had his offense been prosecuted under federal law.155 
Rather, they look to the maximum penalty the person could have received under the 
law of the state at the time the state court sentenced him, in light of the specific facts 
presented to the state court.156 This principle ensures that when federal law requires 
an assessment of the severity of conduct already punished under state law, federal 
courts defer to states’ determinations of how severe the conduct was. The principle is 
parallel to copyright law’s deference to state law’s determination of who is and who 
is not the heir of a copyright holder. 
These anecdotes, like the ones Justice Kennedy pointed to in Windsor, will 
establish a tradition of federal deference to state action. It is important to note, 
however, just what this tradition entails. There is not a tradition of federal deference 
to state prosecution in all cases punishable by death under federal law. The opposite 
is true. There is a long history, dating to the early Congresses, of federal capital 
punishment for exclusively federal offenses or federal offenses punishable under 
state law, but historically prosecuted with frequency in federal courts.157 Because 
                                                                                                                                          
courts the first opportunity to review a claim, and to correct any constitutional violation in the 
first instance.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
 152 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) 
(holding that state law is used to identify next of kin inheriting federal copyright)).  
 153 21 U.S.C. §841(b) (2012) (providing for enhanced penalties for various drug offenses if 
the defendant committed the offense after committing a felony); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) 
(prohibiting the possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony); see Wayne 
A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime 
Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 78–84 (2006) (discussing federal reliance on state law for 
predicate felony offenses) (“[S]tates play a significant role in the federal criminal justice 
system.”).  
 154 See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2012).  
 155 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 582 (2010) (“The mere possibility that 
the defendant's conduct, coupled with facts outside of the record of conviction, could have 
authorized a felony conviction under federal law is insufficient to satisfy the statutory 
command that a noncitizen be ‘convicted of a[n] aggravated felony’ before he loses the 
opportunity to seek cancellation of removal.”).  
 156 See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 243 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (because the 
state court did not make the findings necessary to subject the federal defendant to an 
enhanced, greater than one-year state sentence for a prior state offense, the federal court could 
not conclude that the defendant’s prior state offense was punishable by more than one year 
imprisonment); United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 2011) (same).  
 157 See Little, supra note 16, at 360–71 (describing the history of the federal death penalty 
from the Constitutional Convention through Furman) (“The federal death penalty thus has 
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there is no tradition of states determining the appropriate punishments for offenses 
that invoke federal interests, Windsor will not apply if the defendant is charged with 
such an offense, regardless of the law of the state in which he is alleged to have 
committed his crime. The solution, in short, does not encroach on federal interests 
like the solutions discussed in Part II.  
C. A Federal Death Penalty Notice Interfered With the State Law Right 
If the prerequisites to applying Windsor are satisfied, the court will move on to 
the third step—determining whether the filing of the death penalty notice interfered 
with the state law right to avoid execution. The defendant will need to show the 
federal action in a federal prosecution for a federal crime actually interfered with a 
state law right applicable only to violations of state law. As discussed, previously, 
when defendants have made such arguments (in the context of Tenth 
Amendment/state sovereignty challenges), courts have pointed out that a federal 
death penalty prosecution does not prevent a state from seeking a lesser form of 
punishment under state law for the same or similar conduct.158 In Windsor, however, 
Justice Kennedy recognized that when federal law exists in an area typically 
regulated by states, application of the federal law can result in the state law not 
achieving its animating purposes. This is true even if actual preemption does not 
occur. In such cases, federal interference with a state law right is cognizable.159 The 
Windsor Court pointed out the ways DOMA interfered with the intended policy 
goals lying behind the state same-sex marriage law without actually interfering with 
the state law’s legal effect—by placing a “stigma” on those who exercised the same-
sex marriage right; by diminishing the “stability and predictability” of same-sex 
marriages recognized by the state; by “humiliat[ing]” children being raised by 
                                                                                                                                          
been part of our national structure since our country's earliest origins.”). Capital offenses that 
are punishable only under federal law include: murder of an American national on foreign 
soil, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1119, 2332 (2012); murder related to maritime navigation, see 18 
U.S.C. § 2280 (2012); and treason, see 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012). Capital offenses that, though 
punishable under state law, are typically prosecuted federally include: murder involving a 
weapon of mass destruction, see 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a); murder by a federal prisoner, see 18 
U.S.C. § 1118 (2012); and murder during a bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2012). For 
example, between 1927 and 1963, only twenty-four federal executions occurred. See DEATH 
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Federal Executions 1927–2003, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-executions-1927-2003. Eight of these executions 
were for exclusively federal offenses related to wartime espionage or sabotage. Id. The other 
executions were mostly for offenses involving strong federal interests, including: interstate 
kidnapping, murdering federal law enforcement agents, murder committed while robbing a 
federally insured bank, murder on the high seas, and murder on federal property. Id.  
 158 See United States v. Tuck Chong, 123 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (“Sentencing . . . according 
to federal law for a federal crime neither violates Hawaii State sovereignty nor the Tenth 
Amendment, under the doctrine of dual sovereignty.”); United States v. O’Reilly, No. 05-
80025, 2007 WL 2421378, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2007) (same).  
 159 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). The amicus appointed to 
defend DOMA argued that DOMA and a state law right to same-sex marriage could coexist 
because DOMA did not technically preempt the state law. Brief of Respondents, at 32, 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (2013) (No. 12-307) (“DOMA permitted states to perform their 
role as “laboratories of democracy,” while at the same time ensuring that no one state's 
experiment would be imposed on other states or on the federal government.”).  
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homosexual couples; and by denying homosexual couples federal benefits and 
protections normally triggered when individuals enter into valid marriages under 
state law.160 
A federal death penalty prosecution in a non-death penalty state similarly 
interferes with the policy purposes behind a state’s abolition of the death penalty, 
even if it does not technically preempt state law. First, and most obviously, it 
eventually results in the death of an individual as punishment for conduct the state 
determined does not warrant death. The state’s policy choice and the federal death 
penalty prosecution’s intended end are mutually exclusive.  
Additionally, the existence of the federal death penalty in a non-death penalty 
state injects the potential for arbitrariness after a state has endeavored to create 
certainty and predictability in punishment. The danger that the death penalty is 
applied arbitrarily has long been considered a chief problem with the punishment.161 
Death penalty opponents contend that crime is at least as effectively deterred by less 
severe punishments certain to be imposed as by more severe punishments 
administered arbitrarily.162 Abolitionist states have accepted this argument. Thus, 
were it not for the federal death penalty, an individual in a non-death penalty state 
could know before committing a premeditated murder the punishment he will face if 
apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted. A federal death penalty notice filed in one 
of these states reintroduces the possibility for arbitrary punishment. To the extent the 
                                                                                                                                          
 160 See id. at 2693. 
 161 E.g., California and Pennsylvania Courts Divide on Question of Admissibility of Details 
of Prior Unrelated Offenses at Hearing on Sentencing Under Split Verdict Statutes, 110 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1036, 1040 (1962) (arguing that the death penalty cannot be justified by 
retribution because “[w]hen the death penalty is imposed as a gratification of this retributive 
impulse, the process of decision necessarily becomes arbitrary and irrational”); Book Note, 
Strategies of Abolition, 84 YALE L.J. 1769, 1774 (1975) (reviewing CHARLES L. BLACK 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (“If the penalty of death 
cannot be imposed . . . without considerable measures of arbitrariness and mistake, does the 
execution of citizens, some for the wrong reason, some wrongly, and some for no reason at 
all, deter other citizens sufficiently better than long imprisonment?”); see also Callins v. 
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1159 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I am . . . optimistic . . . that 
this Court will eventually conclude that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness while preserving 
fairness in the infliction of death is so plainly doomed to failure that it—and the death 
penalty—must be abandoned altogether.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).  
 162 Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria first made this point, maintaining that the deterrent 
value of the death penalty was so low that it did not justify its costs, and that certain, swiftly 
executed punishment better deterred crime than a more severe, arbitrary punishment. See John 
D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and 
the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, *44 (2009). More recently, various 
studies have shown that the death penalty’s deterrent effect is insignificant. E.g., Earl F. 
Martin, Masking the Evil of Capital Punishment, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 179, 199 (2002) 
(“If we are searching for affirmative proof that the death penalty accomplishes an accepted 
purpose of criminal punishment, the record on deterrence is lacking to the point of 
nonexistence.”); Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide 
Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 504 (2009) 
(“[T]he vast majority of the world’s top criminologists believe that the empirical research has 
revealed the deterrence hypothesis for a myth.”).  
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certainty of a particular punishment promotes deterrence,163 that deterrence is lost 
due to the federal death penalty’s use.164 Moreover, to the extent that the state sought 
to benefit its citizens who might commit crimes by giving them advance knowledge 
of what punishment they might face, the federal death penalty renders that benefit 
null. 
Third, just as DOMA interfered with the ability of secondary beneficiaries of the 
same-sex marriage right to enjoy that right (the children of same-sex couples), so too 
does the existence of the federal death penalty interfere with the ability of 
individuals other than those who commit crimes to enjoy the benefit of the state’s 
vow not to execute its citizens.165 When a state abolishes the death penalty, it ensures 
none of its citizens will have to participate—as jurors, witnesses, court personnel, 
journalists, prison officials, pharmacists (preparing lethal drugs), or simply 
concerned members of the community—in a process about which many have moral 
objections. The federal death penalty cannot be administered without the 
involvement of these very individuals. Whether a defendant is being prosecuted in 
state court and facing life imprisonment, or in federal court and facing death, the 
same witnesses will be called on to testify at sentencing; the same locality will 
provide the basis for the jury pool; the same journalists will cover the case; and the 
same community that prided itself on not executing its citizens will have its dignity 
insulted by legal “machinery of death” being tinkered with in its midst.166  
D. Animus Motivated the Federal Prosecutor’s Charging Decision 
1. The Animus Standard 
The final step in analyzing the Windsor-based challenge will be applying due 
process scrutiny. In Windsor, this step entailed asking whether a legitimate federal 
                                                                                                                                          
 163 E.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 n.21 (1963) (“It is of course a commonplace of classical 
criminal-law theory that certainty and immediacy of punishment are more crucial elements of 
effective deterrence than its severity.”).  
 164 Although the literature focuses primarily on the lack of the death penalty’s deterrent 
effect, as opposed to the possibility that a certain punishment of life without parole carries 
with it greater deterrent effect than a possible death sentence, there is research suggestive of 
this latter conclusion. See William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder and Capital 
Punishment in the Evolving Context of the Post-Furman Era, 66 SOC. FORCES 774, 784 (1988) 
(reporting that a study of murder rates between 1973 and 1984 demonstrated that fewer 
murders occurred in abolitionist states than in death penalty states).  
 165 The defendant in O’Reilly, discussed in Part I, made this argument to no avail. United 
States v. O’Reilly, No. 05-80025, 2007 WL 2421378, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2007).  
 166 See Collins, 510 U.S. at 1143 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Notably, the FDPA requires 
that federal executions be carried out in accordance with “the manner prescribed by the law of 
the State in which the sentence is imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (2012). When a federal death 
sentence is imposed in a non-death penalty state, “the court shall designate another State, the 
law of which does provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, and the sentence 
shall be implemented in the latter State in the manner prescribed by such law.” Id. Admittedly, 
this provision does spare a non-death penalty state the indignity of an execution occurring 
within its borders. However, it does not spare the citizens from participating in all phases of 
the death penalty prosecution up until the individual is actually executed.  
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interest or animus motivated the federal action.167 Importantly, the animus the Court 
apparently found to have motivated DOMA (and which thus rendered DOMA 
invalid) was not animus towards homosexuals. Had Congress exhibited individual-
directed animus, the analysis would have been much simpler. It was nothing new 
that a statute motivated by animus towards individuals lacks a rational basis and thus 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Prior to Windsor, the Court held that a federal 
statute failed rational basis review and denied equal protection when the legislative 
history revealed Congress’s “bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”168 If 
it had been individuals Congress directed animus towards, the Court could have 
rested its decision on equal protection grounds and omitted any discussion of the 
way New York conferred an important new right on its citizens and the way the 
federal government interfered with that right.169 The Court did not do this. Instead of 
searching for evidence of Congress’s ill will towards homosexuals, Justice Kennedy 
identified evidence of Congress’s disdain for the right to same-sex marriage.170 
                                                                                                                                          
 167 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“DOMA seeks to injure the 
very class New York seeks to protect.”).  
 168 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). Justice O’Connor described 
this principle as “a more searching form of rational basis review.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 763 (2011) (arguing that the rational basis “with bite” 
standard “depends on the idea that governmental ‘animus’ alone is never enough to sustain 
legislation”). The Court has applied this “more searching form of rational basis review” to 
federal and state action alike whenever there was strong evidence that a statute had resulted 
from legislative dislike of an unpopular group. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 
(1996) (a state constitutional provision prohibiting any state law entitling homosexuals to any 
preferred treatment was invalid because it was motivated only by animus); City of Cleburne, 
Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (a state law requiring permitting for a 
mentally handicapped home when other apartments did not require same permit was invalid 
when the requirement rested on “an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded”); 
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533 (a federal law that precluded households containing a member 
unrelated to other members of the household from receiving food stamps was invalid because 
the legislative history showed that the purpose of the law was to discriminate against hippies). 
 169 Before Windsor, some scholars argued that the Court should invalidate DOMA on equal 
protection grounds using this heightened form of rational basis review. E.g., Eric Berger, 
Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 765, 802 (2013) (“Of course, given that same-sex marriage bans penalize an 
unpopular group, the Court should, at a minimum, apply heightened rational basis review 
. . . .”); Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 931-32 
(2010) (“The analogy to the earlier cases makes sense. DOMA cuts off federal benefits to a 
targeted, politically unpopular group—just like the law in Moreno—and it does so in a 
remarkably broad and undifferentiated way—just like the law in Romer.”). Lower federal 
courts had even done so. E.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 669 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389–90 (D. 
Mass. 2010).  
 170 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2963 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law 
here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who 
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”); id. 
(“The congressional goal was to put a thumb on the scales and influence a state’s decision as 
to how to shape its own marriage laws.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 2693-4 
(“The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex 
marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal 
law.”); id. (“The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like 
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Accordingly, the Court borrowed the animus principle from equal protection and 
applied it in a substantive due process case. In the wake of Windsor, also invalid is a 
federal action that interferes with a fundamental state law right in an area 
traditionally regulated by states when animus toward the right motivated the 
action.171  
This distinction will be crucial here. All charging decisions are motivated, to 
some extent, by animus towards an individual defendant, or at least towards the 
actions the prosecutor believes the defendant undertook. Thus, a standard that 
searches for impermissible animus towards a defendant would be unhelpful in a 
context where the government is expected to be its citizen’s adversary. Windsor’s 
review for animus towards a right (rather than towards individuals), however, is 
precisely on point in the context of a state law-based challenge to the federal death 
penalty’s use. At the fourth step, the court will consider whether animus toward a 
state’s decision to abolish the death penalty motivated the federal prosecutor to bring 
charges and to then seek the death penalty in a particular case. In essence, the court 
will ask whether, but for the state’s lack of a death penalty, the federal prosecutor 
would have not filed federal charges in the first place and instead allowed state 
officials to prosecute the defendant.172 
This fourth step will do more than give constitutional status to the now-repealed 
provision of the Capital Case Protocols providing that “[i]n states where the 
imposition of the death penalty is not authorized by law the fact that the maximum 
federal penalty is death is insufficient, standing alone, to show a more substantial 
                                                                                                                                          
governmental efficiency.”). Admittedly, some language in the opinion refers to animus 
towards those who enter into same-sex marriages. See, e.g., id. at 2695 (“[T]he principal 
purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful 
same-sex marriage.”); id. at 2694 (“[P]urpose and effect to disparage and to injure those 
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”). 
However, these statements suggest that Congress targeted these individuals not because they 
were homosexuals, but rather because they either did or could exercise the state law right to 
engage in same-sex marriage.  
 171 Prior to Windsor, at least one scholar anticipated such a rule. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, 
Putting Rationality Back Into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and 
Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 541–42 (2011) 
(suggesting that courts should look to a legislature’s actual motives when to determine 
whether animus exists when applying substantive due process because “[i]n the same way that 
majorities can discriminate against minorities in singling them out for discriminatory 
treatment, majorities can also fail to recognize or infringe upon politically unpopular rights.”).  
 172 Importantly, the relevant inquiry is whether animus motivated the decision to seek the 
death penalty, not necessarily the decision to indict the defendant federally. However, when 
there is no legitimate federal interest in the prosecution and the prosecutor has no animosity 
towards a state’s lack of the death penalty, then he will likely not seek a federal indictment in 
the first place.  
  By focusing on whether animus motivated the federal prosecution, this inquiry ensures 
that a federal defendant sentenced to death cannot bring a post-conviction claim based on a 
change in state law. If a state provided for capital punishment at the time of the defendant’s 
prosecution, then a defendant would have no basis for asserting that prosecutors, at the time 
that they charged him, were motivated by animus toward a state law right that was, at that 
time, nonexistent.  
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interest in federal prosecution.”173 Under this provision, a state’s lack of a death 
penalty, coupled with some other federal interest, could support seeking the federal 
death penalty in a particular case. However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor 
made clear that when federal action would not have occurred but for animus, the 
existence of a legitimate federal interest is immaterial.174 Therefore, the court will 
ask whether a state’s lack of the death penalty in any way, or at any point in the 
Justice Department’s death penalty charging process, determined the ultimate 
decision. If so, then the court will dismiss the death penalty notice.  
Importantly, though, the court will also not adopt a rule making an attempt to 
seek the federal death penalty a per se substantive due process deprivation when an 
offense was committed in and punishable under the law of a non-death penalty state. 
Windsor does not require so much. Justice Kennedy’s analysis suggests that, had the 
record indicated a legitimate federal interest actually led Congress to enact DOMA, 
the Court would have upheld the statute. It was the evidence of a contrary subjective 
intent that doomed the provision. Likewise here, if a federal interest other than the 
punishments available under state law motivated the federal action, then a court will 
reject the defendant’s challenge. This is true without regard to the strength of the 
federal interest. As discussed, Windsor did not apply a form of heightened scrutiny 
that required weighing the federal interest against the burden on the right. The 
Court’s heightened review involved simply asking whether some federal interest 
actually motivated the action.175 The court will do the same here. So long as an 
                                                                                                                                          
 173 Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 20, at 79.  
 174 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate 
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by 
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”). Importantly, as Justice 
Scalia pointed out in his dissent, in Romer, there was evidence that the statute at issue was 
motivated, at least in part, by permissible moral disapproval of homosexual conduct. See 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court did 
not consider whether a permissible motive based on moral disapproval salvaged the statute 
from being invalidated based on its impermissible, animus-related motive (assuming that 
moral disapproval and animus constitute separate reasons, as Justice Scalia suggested). See 
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 89, 
115–16, 132 (1997) (arguing that morals-driven legislation and animus-driven legislation are 
separate and distinct, and that the Romer Court did not try to sift through innocent motivations 
from impermissible ones). 
 175 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696; see also Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 
U.S. 522, 528 (1958) (applying rational basis review and holding “[t]hat a statute may 
discriminate in favor of a certain class does not render it arbitrary if the discrimination is 
founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy.”); Laura C. Bornstein, 
Contextualizing Cleburne, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 91, 113 (2010) (noting that, in the 
wake of Cleburne (which applied heightened rational basis review courts upheld other 
restrictions on rights of mentally disabled by applying rational basis review and finding a 
legitimate governmental objective); Michael Kent Curtis & Shannon Gilreath, Transforming 
Teenagers Into Oral Sex Felons: The Persistence of the Crime Against Nature After Lawrence 
v. Texas, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 196 (2008) (stating that heightened rational basis 
review applies when a governmental action “disadvantages a historically unpopular or 
vulnerable group . . .when it is based on animus or prejudice, when justifications for singling 
out the group and not others similarly situated are weak—suggesting mere hostility, and when 
the classification is irrational when looked at clearly and without the benefit of naked 
disapproval.”).  
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actual federal interest prompted the decision to seek the death penalty, meaning the 
federal prosecution would have occurred regardless of whether the defendant would 
have been subject to the death penalty in a state prosecution, then the court will 
allow the death penalty prosecution to proceed.176  
Thus, even if the defendant’s crime is one traditionally punished by states 
alone—thus the challenge gets past the second step—this fourth step will further 
preserve federal authority to punish for federal crimes. This is important, because, 
without doubt, there are cases where a defendant’s crime, although looking at face 
value like a typical murder, involves significant federal interests. For example, a 
federal jury in Iowa sentenced Daniel Honken to death after Honken was involved in 
five murders.177 Honken’s murders were not unlike others prosecuted routinely by 
states; however, they triggered federal interests. Hoken committed the offenses while 
on pre-trial release after being charged with federal methamphetamine 
manufacturing and distribution offenses.178 Two of the people he killed were drug 
dealers who had purchased methamphetamine from him, and were preparing to 
testify against him.179 Thus, at the charging stage, federal prosecutors suspected 
Honken of committing multiple murders to thwart a pending federal prosecution. In 
the face of such strong federal interests, it is safe to assume the prosecutors would 
have indicted Honken and filed a death penalty notice in his case regardless of the 
state where the offenses occurred. Windsor-based scrutiny, unlike the Eighth 
Amendment-based proposals offered by Mannheimer and the student commentator, 
assures a defendant like Honken will not arbitrarily benefit from state law when his 
crime had an obvious federal dimension.  
                                                                                                                                          
 176 In a case where both a federal interest and animus motivated the federal charges, the 
court will consider whether the federal interest would have justified the federal prosecution 
even if there had been no improper animus. If so, then the death penalty notice challenge will 
fail despite the animus showing. This assumes that the court adopts the “but for” causation 
framework endorsed by the Supreme Court for mixed-motive Title VII discrimination claims. 
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989).   
 177 United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 178 Id. at 1149–50. In fact, there was an interstate dimension to Honken’s 
methamphetamine distribution activities, and, thus, to his related murders. Honken first 
produced methamphetamine in Arizona and sold it to an Iowa dealer. Id. Iowa law 
enforcement officers arrested Honken during a visit to his dealer’s Iowa home. Thereafter, 
Honken moved to Iowa. Id.  
 179 Id. at 1151. Another example of a federal death sentence handed down in a non-death 
penalty state where there was no evidence of animus and a strong federal interest readily 
apparent is the case of Gary Lee Sampson. See United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13 (1st 
Cir. 2007). Sampson first committed several bank robberies in North Carolina and then drove 
to Massachusetts. Id. at 18. There, he committed two gruesome carjackings and murders. Id. 
After the second murder, he drove to New Hampshire and then to Vermont before being 
apprehended. Id. Although Sampson’s murders occurred in Massachusetts (a non-death 
penalty state) and were punishable under Massachusetts law, Sampson committed his crimes 
while on an interstate flight from federal authorities after having committed federal crimes. Id. 
Thus, the federal interest behind the federal death notice in his case was obvious.  
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2. Possible Means of Proving Animus 
Although Windsor dictates the substantive analysis to be applied to the 
hypothetical motion to dismiss, it offers less guidance on how a defendant can prove 
animus. Windsor involved a challenge to legislative action, and the Court had before 
it an extensive legislative record from which it could glean repeated examples of 
legislators giving voice to the impermissible motivation behind the statute. 
Executive action like the type that the defendant will object to here, however, does 
not take place in such daylight. A prosecutor makes charging decisions away from 
public scrutiny, and her decisions are generally immune from judicial review. During 
the capital case review process, field prosecutors and Main Justice officials produce 
documents revealing their subjective motivations.180 Those documents, however, are 
not discoverable by a criminal defendant during the normal course of discovery.181 
Therefore, when a defendant attempts to establish his claim that animus motivated 
the federal death penalty prosecution, an informational disparity will exist. It will be 
the rare case when a defendant will be able to rely on circumstantial evidence alone 
to establish animus, without case-specific documents shedding light on the Justice 
Department’s internal deliberations.182  
There are a few ways a court could remedy this disparity. First, the court could 
apply a presumption of animus whenever a defendant seeks to dismiss a federal 
death penalty notice in a case arising in a non-death penalty jurisdiction (when the 
crime is punishable under state law). Such a presumption would shift the burden to 
                                                                                                                                          
 180 Relevant documents are those prepared by the United States Attorney and submitted to 
Main Justice, including, inter alia: (1) a prosecution memorandum, making a recommendation 
for or against seeking the death penalty and setting forth the prosecutor’s basis for the 
recommendation (in light of the facts of the offense, the victim, and the defendant); (2) a 
standardized death penalty evaluation form; (3) “non-decisional information”; and (4) a draft 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty. See U.S. ATT’YS MANUAL § 9-10.080 (2014). 
Additionally, a defendant may seek to discover the written recommendation of the Capital 
Case Review Committee prepared based on the U.S. Attorney’s submission and transmitted to 
the Attorney General. See id. at § 9-10.130.  
 181 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(2); see also United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246–
47 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal prosecutors’ death penalty evaluation form and prosecution 
memorandum were not subject to discovery and protected by the work product doctrine 
because they were “internal government documents prepared by the U.S. Attorney in 
anticipation of litigation”); Amobi v. Dist. of Col. Dep’t of Corr., 262 F.R.D. 45, 57 (D.D.C. 
2009) (prosecutor’s notes and other documents relevant to her decision to charge defendant 
were “pre-decisional and deliberative” and therefore not subject to discovery); U.S. ATT’YS 
MANUAL § 9-10.050 (2014) (“The decision-making process preliminary to the Attorney 
General's final decision is confidential. Information concerning the deliberative process may 
only be disclosed within the Department and its investigative agencies as necessary to assist 
the review and decision-making.”).  
 182 Others have recognized that the same is true in the context of other Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clause challenges to charging decisions. See Anne Bowen Poulin, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States 
v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1092 (1997) (“The evidence necessary to 
substantiate a selective prosecution claim is frequently hidden in prosecution or law 
enforcement files.”); id. at 1102 (“To gather evidence [of selective prosecution] with limited 
or no court-ordered discovery requires not only ingenuity but also resources unavailable to 
many defendants.”). 
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the government to come forward with evidence showing no improper animus 
motivated its charging decision.183 The U.S. Attorney would, therefore, offer the 
documents prepared in the defendant’s case to show a legitimate federal interest 
behind the prosecution, thus rebutting the presumption.184  
There is precedent for such a presumption. In Blackledge v. Perry,185 the 
Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s charging decision cannot be motivated by 
vindictiveness towards a defendant for exercising a procedural right.186 The Court 
then applied a presumption of vindictiveness to the state prosecutor’s charging of the 
defendant with a felony offense after the prosecutor first obtained a conviction on a 
misdemeanor charge and the defendant exercised a state statutory right to a new trial 
de novo.187 Since Blackledge, however, the Court has declined to extend the 
presumption of vindictiveness beyond instances where there is an obvious and strong 
likelihood the prosecutor’s action was vindictive.188 In other circumstances, the 
Court has applied a “presumption of regularity” to charging decisions, citing the 
executive branch’s constitutionally assigned duty to ensure the laws are faithfully 
executed,189 and the fact that charging decisions are “particularly ill-suited to judicial 
review.”190 As discussed, there are a range of legitimate reasons for a federal 
                                                                                                                                          
 183 See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984) (explaining, in the context of a 
vindictive prosecution claim “where the presumption [of vindictiveness] applies, the . . . 
prosecutor must rebut the presumption that an increased . . . charge resulted from 
vindictiveness; where the presumption does not apply, the defendant must affirmatively prove 
actual vindictiveness” (alteration to original)).  
 184 See, e.g., United States v. King, 126 F.3d 394, 399–400 (2d Cir. 1997) (Blackledge 
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness rebutted when government came forward with a 
legitimate basis for the additional charges following a mistrial and developed a record to 
support its asserted justification). 
 185 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id. at 28 (noting that there was “no evidence that the prosecutor . . . acted in bad faith or 
maliciously” but that a presumption of vindictiveness applied because “[a] person convicted 
of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension 
that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one”).  
 188 See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380–81 (1982) (declining to apply a 
presumption of vindictiveness to the pretrial obtaining of a felony indictment after a 
prosecutor initially sought only misdemeanor charges and the defendant refused to engage in 
plea bargaining and insisted on going to trial); see also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 566  
(acknowledging that “the Court has been chary about extending the . . . presumption of 
vindictiveness”). Since Goodwin, lower courts have generally held that the presumption of 
vindictiveness applies only where the circumstances objectively establish “a realistic 
likelihood” of vindictiveness. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 
2001); United States v. King, 126 F.3d 394, 397–98 (2d Cir. 1997).  
 189 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II § 
3).  
 190 See United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (observing that charging 
decisions involve the weighing of factors like “the strength of the case, the prosecution's 
general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship 
to the Government's overall enforcement plan” which “are not readily susceptible to the kind 
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”); see also Robert Heller, Comment, 
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prosecutor’s seeking the federal death penalty even for a crime committed in and 
punishable under the laws of a state that does not execute its citizens. The mere fact 
that a capital federal case arises in a non-death penalty state does not, by itself, 
constitute circumstances establishing a substantial likelihood that animus motivated 
the prosecutorial decision. In light of the Court’s avowed fear of disturbing 
prosecutorial discretion in other circumstances, the presumption of animus will 
likely be too costly a prophylactic measure to prevent animus-motivated federal 
death penalty prosecutions.191 
The better solution will be for courts to allow defendants, in limited 
circumstances, access to the Justice Department’s documents relevant to the 
charging decision in their cases. Discovery will not be appropriate in all cases. For 
the same reasons courts are reluctant to review charging decisions at all, they are 
also reluctant to allow defendants access to the materials that facilitate those 
charging decisions.192 Thus, in the contexts of other types of due process or equal 
protection challenges to a charging decision, courts require a defendant seeking 
discovery to make a threshold showing (based on the evidence in his possession) of 
an improper prosecutorial motive. For a selective prosecution claim, the Supreme 
Court has described the showing required of a defendant as “some evidence tending 
                                                                                                                                          
Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful 
Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325–28 (1997) 
(discussing the commonly stated rationales for limiting judicial review of executive branch 
charging decisions, namely, “(1) promoting prosecutorial and judicial economy and avoiding 
delay; (2) preventing the chilling of law enforcement; (3) avoiding the undermining of 
prosecutorial effectiveness; and (4) adhering to the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers and assessing the relative competence of the executive and judicial branches of 
government regarding the prosecutorial function.” (footnote omitted)).  
 191 Moreover, it is not even clear that a presumption of animus would actually help 
defendants at all. Justice Department officials could easily circumvent such a presumption by 
adopting an official policy prohibiting written discussion of state death penalty policy in any 
official communication. A policy like that would ensure that prosecutors do not produce 
evidence helpful to establishing a Windsor-based claim of animus, but it would not necessarily 
eradicate state law-directed animus from capital charging decisions. The policy would allow 
informal consideration of state policies to persist, even if formal consideration abated.  
 192 See, e.g., United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
not allowing a defendant claiming vindictive prosecution automatic discovery “protects the 
interests in open and frank discussions within prosecutorial offices; protects the government 
from harassment or delay by criminal defendants; and frees the judicial system of criminal 
trials with irrelevant massive discovery” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Berrios, 
501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that allowing discovery whenever a claim of 
selective prosecution is asserted would “encourage use of the defense of selective prosecution, 
however baseless, as a means of obtaining discovery to which the defense would not 
otherwise be entitled.”); see also Poulin, supra note 182, at 1096 (“A barrier to discovery . . . 
is appropriate only when necessary to protect truly sensitive government information. For 
example, to establish a meritorious selective prosecution claim, the defendant may seek 
internal memoranda discussing decisions to prosecute particular cases. While this evidence 
may provide an essential window into the prosecutor's motivation, it implicates the greatest 
governmental interest in confidentiality, reflecting the detailed thought process of the 
executive branch.”).  
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/9
2014] THE MARRIAGE OF STATE AND LAW 143 
 
to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense.”193 Courts generally 
treat the “some evidence” standard as requiring enough circumstantial evidence to 
suggest an improper motive, while not demanding so much evidence as would 
establish improper motive.194 The court will likely apply this same standard here and 
require the defendant to come forward with enough circumstantial evidence to 
suggest animus in his case. If he does so, then the court will allow him access to the 
documents prosecutors prepared in his case.195 At minimum, the court will conclude 
that, in light of the circumstantial evidence of animus, the government must submit 
relevant charging documents for in camera review and possible discovery by the 
defendant if the documents do reveal animus towards the state law right factored into 
the charging decision.196   
First, a defendant might show that federal prosecutors do not generally charge 
individuals who commit similar actions in other states that do have the death 
penalty.197 For example, Gabrion, who, as discussed in Part I, received a federal 
                                                                                                                                          
 193 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). Lower courts have 
applied this same standard to vindictive prosecution claims. See United States v. Bucci, 582 
F.3d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 2000); 
United States v. One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d 415, 421 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 194 See United States v. Thorpe, 471 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Although the ‘some 
evidence’ standard is rigorous, it is still relatively light, because obviously, a defendant need 
not prove his case in order to justify discovery on an issue.” (internal citation, alteration, and 
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In 
light of [the Supreme Court’s] seemingly less stringent ‘some evidence tending to show’ 
standard, the defendants need not establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution to 
obtain discovery on these issues. Nevertheless, given the heavy burden that discovery can 
impose on the government, the showing necessary to obtain discovery for a selective 
prosecution defense must itself be a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial 
claims.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).  
 195 The “some evidence” discovery standard will not only preserve the secrecy of 
prosecutorial decision - making, it will also maintain the evidentiary value of Justice 
Department’s charging documents. So long as prosecutors know that charging documents will 
only be subject to discovery in a rare case, they are unlikely to manipulate the documents’ 
content. Thus, if federal prosecutors charged a defendant based on a belief that his crime 
warranted the death penalty, and that punishment was not available under state law, then this 
fact will likely appear in the charging documents.  
 196 In camera review might further preserve the secrecy of the government’s decision-
making process while still allowing the defendant to access the relevant documents. In some 
selective prosecution cases, courts have ordered in camera review before allowing the 
defendant to receive the relevant documents. See United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403, 1405 
(1974) (in case involving selective prosecution claim, explaining that the defendant can access 
charging memoranda upon a threshold showing of discrimination, “[b]ut even then the court 
can minimize the risk to the government by holding the proceedings in camera” (citing FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 16(e))).  
 197 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470. Since the Windsor-based challenge will arise under the Due 
Process Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause, a court will not require the defendant 
to show discriminatory effect. However, the existence of similarly situated individuals who 
were not prosecuted or prosecuted differently can also be relevant in showing discriminatory 
motive. See United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant made a 
showing of discriminatory motive where via evidence the prosecutor had targeted black 
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death sentence for committing a murder while within the boundaries of a national 
forest, could have relied on this type of evidence.198 Gabrion could have pointed out 
that states which have the death penalty routinely prosecute those who commit 
murders on federal lands.199  
Second, a defendant might rely on statements made by a prosecutor—either state 
or federal—insinuating, if not actually stating, that federal prosecution was 
commenced because the prosecutor believed state law would not provide for an 
adequate punishment. Ronell Wilson, for example, might have used this type of 
evidence to challenge the death penalty notice in his federal case. In 2004, a federal 
grand jury indicted Wilson for the murder of two New York police detectives.200 A 
state grand jury had previously indicted Wilson for the offense, but, after the state 
indictment issued, the New York high court invalidated the state’s death penalty 
statute.201 The federal prosecution began thereafter, and the state prosecutors sought 
to dismiss the state indictment. At that time, the New York City police commissioner 
shared with reporters his opinion that the case warranted capital punishment.202 
Similarly, the state district attorney acknowledged that, after the high court ruled, 
state and federal prosecutors had met and discerned a previously undiscovered 
federal interest in the case—insinuating, if not acknowledging the need for capital 
punishment.203 
                                                                                                                                          
elected officials for voter fraud, but had not prosecuted similarly situated white elected 
officials), vacated in part on other grounds, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988).  
 198 See supra, Part I.  
 199 See State v. Allen, 626 S.E.2d 271, 276–79 (N.C. 2006) (state death sentence imposed 
for a murder committed by an escaped state prisoner within boundaries of the Uhwarrie 
National Forest); Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 1728, 729–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) 
(state death sentence imposed after the victim’s body was found within boundary of the Sam 
Houston National Forest, and evidence suggested that defendant committed crime there). 
Importantly, some states retain concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed on federal 
lands, while other states do not. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104-32 (1979) (reserving “over 
any lands as to which any legislative jurisdiction may be ceded to the United States . . . 
concurrent power to enforce the criminal law”), with State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150, 1153 
(Wash. 1989) (concluding state had ceded exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed at 
federal fort). The district court in Gabrion’s case acknowledged that Michigan had retained 
concurrent jurisdiction over the Manistee National Forest (where Gabrion committed his 
offense), and therefore Gabrion could have been prosecuted under state law. See United States 
v. Gabrion, No. 1:99-CR-76, 2006 WL 2473978, at *1 (Aug. 25, 2006).  
 200 United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 201 Id. at 175.  
 202 See Bill Farrell & John Marzulli, Feds Aim to Fry Cop-Slay Suspect, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Nov. 23, 2004, at 22 (“If anyone ever needed a justification for the death penalty, this case is 
it.” Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said, “Anyone responsible for the cold-blooded 
assassination of a police officer should forfeit his life.”).  
 203 See Shalia K. Dewan, U.S. Indicts Man in Death of Detectives in Gun Buy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 2004, at B5 (“Daniel M. Donovan Jr., the Staten Island district attorney, conferred 
with Roslynn Mauskopf, the United States attorney in Brooklyn, on the case. ‘Collectively, we 
have now come to the conclusion that there is a legitimate federal, as well as state, interest in 
the prosecution of this case,’ Mr. Donovan said at a news conference yesterday.”).  
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Wilson’s case also suggests that the factual circumstances of how a federal 
indictment originated can be relevant, even absent prosecutors’ statements in the 
media. Wilson would have had a strong basis for asserting animus based merely on 
the sequence of events that occurred—a state indictment, then a state court’s 
invalidation of the death penalty, followed by a federal indictment and an agreement 
by the state not to proceed with the state prosecution.204  
Of course, in Wilson’s case, the state prosecutors joined their federal 
counterparts in exhibiting animus toward the state law right. In other instances, 
however, state prosecutors might feel differently. Evidence of tension between state 
and federal prosecutors’ offices over whether death is appropriate for certain conduct 
might also be relevant here. For example, Pleau, the Rhode Island citizen discussed 
in Part I, could have established animus based on the pretrial wrangling between 
state and federal authorities, had the federal prosecutor sought the death penalty. By 
noting that federal authorities had gone to great lengths to prosecute him, even 
though state prosecutors had offered and Pleau had agreed to accept state 
punishment for his crimes, Pleau would have had a strong argument that animus 
towards the available state punishment motivated the federal prosecutors.   
The foregoing merely speculates as to how a court could analyze a Windsor-
based challenge to the federal death penalty. Admittedly, before any of this occurs, 
the legal community will have to recognize that Windsor has something to say in this 
context at all. Thereafter, courts will grapple in different ways with how to apply the 
Windsor Court’s federalism-based vision of individual rights to the context of 
federal charging decisions. This Part offers one version of how to do so in a way 
that—adheres to Windsor and the Court’s prior substantive due process precedent; 
allows room for the Justice Department to seek the full range of punishment 
available for an offense when legitimate federal interests justify doing so; and 
otherwise ensures defendants can exercise the rights provided by their states.  
Importantly, the framework described here does not result in the Federal 
Constitution meaning one thing in one state, and another thing in another state. 
Under Windsor, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause means the same thing 
in all states—federal prosecutors cannot initiate prosecutions based on animus 
towards how states choose to punish crimes traditionally subject to state punishment. 
Although a defendant in a non-death penalty state will have a Windsor-based 
challenge available to him, while one in another state will not, it is the difference in 
state law that will lead to this result. Uniformity in the Federal Constitution’s 
meaning will remain.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article’s primary purpose was two-fold. First, it sought to provide a novel 
legal framework for analyzing an issue that has bedeviled courts and 
commentators—the existence of the federal death penalty in non-death penalty 
states. Even the most ardent proponents of the federalization of criminal law will 
                                                                                                                                          
 204 Whitten, 610 F.3d at 175. The timing in Wilson’s case strongly suggests that animus to 
the state court’s decision motivated the federal prosecution. In March 2003, the state grand 
jury indicted Wilson of first-degree murder. Id. The state prosecution continued for more than 
a year. In June 2004, the state court ruled, and in November 2004, the federal grand jury 
returned its indictment. Id. The fact that the federal government did not act in the case for 
more than a year, until after the state court ruled, suggests strongly that the federal indictment 
came down solely as a means of circumventing the state court’s ruling.  
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likely concede that, in at least some instances, there is something unsettling about 
life or death hinging on whether a creative federal prosecutor can discern a federal 
nexus from a crime which, had it occurred in a death penalty state, would have been 
punished under state law. Second, this Article attempted to demonstrate the 
malleability of the Windsor Court’s analysis.  
In truth, these goals were really two ways of proving a single point. As one 
commentator notes, Windsor, along with other cases from the Court’s most recent 
term, “are fundamentally about how constitutional principles interact with social 
conditions.”205 Society’s values change. Confronted with such changes, a court has a 
few options. It can ignore social change entirely, holding that the Constitution 
protects nothing more today than it did centuries ago. It can engraft into the 
Constitution’s text every new moral principle to gain popular approval. Or, it can 
choose a middle route. It can leave adequate room for social innovation at the local 
level in areas of local concern, free of a national entity forcefully imposing 
traditional values. The Windsor Court chose this middle route. It held that when 
society’s thinking is in a state of flux about a matter traditionally resolved at a local 
level, the Constitution demands the national government leave localities alone to sort 
through the difficult social issue. This holds true for the issue of same-sex marriage, 
it also holds true for the issue of capital punishment.  
By requiring the federal government to keep out of these intrinsically local 
debates, the Court leaves room for national consensus to develop organically. 
Perhaps states will come to some agreement that same-sex marriage is appropriate. 
Around that time, the Court might determine that state laws distinguishing based on 
sexual orientation are subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny. Likewise, 
there might come a day when the Court determines the nation’s evolving standards 
of decency have reached a point where the Eighth Amendment no longer tolerates 
capital punishment. Only by the federal government staying out of the states’ 
evolutions on difficult social issues like these will such consensuses ever emerge—
in the area of homosexual rights, capital punishment, or the next important social 
issue about which local communities will bestow new rights.  
                                                                                                                                          
 205 Pamela S. Karlan, Essay, A Moveable Court, BOS. REV., Sept. 23, 2010, at 3.  
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